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Note
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin: A Hole in One for Casey
Martin and the ADA
Melissa Ann Resslar*

I. INTRODUCTION

"[T]he ADA does not distinguish between sports organizations and
other entities when it comes to applying the ADA to a specific
situation .... [T]he disabled have just as much interest in being free
from discrimination in the athletic world as they do in other aspects of
everyday life."'
"If Franklin Roosevelt ran the country out of a wheelchair, Casey
Martin should be able to play golf out of a golf cart. That golf cart is
not going to hit the ball." 2
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") in
1990 in order to eliminate discrimination against individuals with
disabilities. 3 In enacting the ADA, Congress sought to provide more
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1. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (D. Or. 1998) [hereinafter Martin III
(quoting Coffin, J.), afftd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), affid, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001).
2. Nightline: Casey Martin's Triumph, Golfer Produces A Bold Stroke For The Disabled
(ABC television broadcast, Feb. 12, 1998), availableat 1998 WL 5372982 [hereinafter Nightline]
(quoting Chi Chi Rodriguez, professional golfer). In discussing the debate surrounding the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon's decision allowing Casey Martin to use a
golf cart during PGA tournaments, the Nightline program provided interviews with Casey Martin
and Scott Verplank, a diabetic golfer who has been successful on the PGA Tour without using a
golf cart. Id.
3. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l)-(b)(2) (1994). The
ADA was enacted in order:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities;
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than forty-three million physically or mentally disabled Americans with
the full and equal opportunity to goods, services, and accommodations
enjoyed by all other Americans. 4 The ADA extends to all facets of
society, including employment, 5 transportation, 6 and public
accommodations. 7 Most recently,
Congress broadened the ADA's
8
reach to professional sports.
In PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, the United States Supreme Court faced
the issue of whether the ADA applied to a professional sports
organization. 9 Prior to Martin, a number of high profile athletes
successfully battled a disability while competing in professional
baseball, 10 football,11 and track and field. 12 However, it was Casey
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the
standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of
discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(b)(4).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12 101(a). Congress found that:
(1) some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and
this number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older;
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as
employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation,
communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to
public services;
(6) census data, national polls, and other studies have documented that people with
disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely
disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally.
Id.
5. 42U.S.C.§§ 12111-12117.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (1994).
8. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1898 (2001) [hereinafter Martin IV].
9. Id. at 1884.
10. Jim Abbott was a successful pitcher in the 1990s even though he lacked a hand on his
glove arm. Mike Rosen, Editorial, Martin's Suit Against the PGA Was Flawed, THE GAZETTE
(Colorado Springs), Feb. 20, 1998, available at 1998 WL 7982329. Major league baseball
permitted Abbott to spin the baseball in his left hand in order to find the desired grip even though
this is a technical violation of the rules of baseball. Fanfare,WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1998, at E2,
available at 1998 WL 2474036.
11. See W. Kent Davis, Why Is the PGA Teed Off at Casey Martin? An Example of How the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct (ADA) Has Changed Sports Law, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 2
(1998) (citing Matthew J. Mitten, Amateur Athletes with Handicaps or Physical Abnormalities:
Who Makes the ParticipationDecision, 71 NEB. L. REv. 987, 989 (1992)). For example, Kenny
Walker played football for the Denver Broncos and was successful despite being deaf. Id.
12. Id. at 3. Gale Devers, America's gold medal winning track and field star, successfully
competed in the Olympics after being diagnosed with Graves' disease. Id. Graves' disease is a
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Martin, a disabled golfer with a dream of being successful on the
world's most elite golf tour, that brought
the Professional Golf
13
Association (PGA) to the center of this debate.
Casey Martin suffers from Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome, a
degenerative circulatory disorder that causes blood to pool in Martin's
lower right leg. 14 Because Martin's condition is painful and places him
at significant health risks, including possible amputation of his right
leg,' 5 Martin sought a waiver of the PGA's "no-cart" rule' 6 so that he
could qualify for the PGA Tour. 17 After the PGA denied Martin's18
request, he sought an injunction against the PGA's "no-cart" rule.
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that PGA tournaments are places of
accommodation, and that allowing Casey Martin to use a golf cart is a
reasonable accommodation that does not fundamentally alter the nature
of professional golf. 19 Thereafter, the PGA appealed and the United

disease associated with over-activity of the thyroid gland. National Graves' Disease Foundation,
Frequently Asked Questions About Graves' Disease, at http://www.ngdf.org/faq.htm (last
modified Feb. 19, 2001).
13. Of the estimated 25 million golfers in the United States, less than 500 are given the
opportunity to play in a PGA sponsored event each year. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Martin IV, 121
S. Ct. 1879 (2001) (No. 00-24), available at 2000 WL 1706732.
14. Brief for Respondent at 1, Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001) (No. 00-24), available at
2000 WL 1846091. Martin's disability is defined as a "massive, permanent malformation of his
right leg that dramatically limits his ability to walk." Id.; see also infra notes 227-32 and
accompanying text (detailing Martin's disease).
15. John Garrity, Golf Plus, Out on a Limb: His Parents Hoped Casey Martin Would Lead a
Normal Life, Instead He's Living an ExtraordinaryOne, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 9, 1998, at
GI0, available at 1998 WL 8979287 (discussing the health risks that Martin faces every time he
steps on the golf course). Martin is also at risk for developing blood clots and fracturing his right
tibia. Id.
16. UNITED STATES GOLF ASSOCIATION, 2000 OFFICIAL RULES OF GOLF 149 (1999). In
prohibiting competitors to use a golf cart during PGA Tour competitions, the PGA utilizes an
optional provision in the Official Rules of Golf which requires players to "walk at all times
during a stipulated round." Id. Prior to Martin, the PGA had never waived the "no-cart" rule for
an athlete. Martin 11, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Or. 1998), aff'd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000),
affid, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001).
17. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1886 (2001). Due to the high degree of pain that Martin must
endure and the significant health risks that he faces by the mere act of walking, his treating
physician testified that it is medically necessary for Martin to use a golf cart in order to compete
during a golf tournament. Martin 11, 994 F. Supp. at 1244.
18. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (D. Or. 1998) [hereinafter Martin
1], affid, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), affid, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001).
19. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Martin III],
aff'd, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001); Martin 11, 994 F. Supp. at 1246, 1252; Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. at
1326.
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States Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve a split
20
between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.
The United States Supreme Court faced two issues in Martin.2' First,
the Court considered whether the ADA provided a disabled competitor
access to a professional golf tournament. 22 Second, the Court examined
whether the PGA can deny a disabled competitor the use of a golf cart
because the cart "fundamentally alters" the nature of PGA
tournaments. 23 Professional golfers weighed in on both sides of this
controversial issue. 24 Legendary golfers such as Arnold Palmer and
Jack Nicklaus testified on behalf of the PGA.2 5 The PGA argued that its
golf tournaments are not subject to Title III of the ADA, and that
waiving the "no-cart" rule would remove the fatigue element from
professional golf. 26 Thus, allowing Casey Martin to use a cart would
fundamentally alter the nature of professional golf. 27 The public 28 and a
group of fellow golfers, however, sided with Martin.2 9 Martin argued
that the PGA is subject to Title III of the ADA as a place of public

20. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1889; see also infra Part I1.C.4 (discussing the Seventh Circuit's
opinion in Olinger v. United States Golf Assoc.).
21. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1884.
22. Id.
23. Id. Under Title III of the ADA, an entity is not required to make a reasonable
accommodation for a disabled individual if the requested accommodation fundamentally alters
the nature of the accommodation being offered. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994); see also
infra notes 77-92 and accompanying text (detailing a prima facie case under Title II).
24. Bruce Meadows, A Lot Riding on Martin Case PGA Finds Itself in Lose-Lose Situation,
PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa), Feb. 8, 1998, at C4, available at 1998 WL 5703668; Cameron
Morfit, Golf Plus, Winning A La Cart While Preparing to Fight the Tourfor the Right to Ride,
Casey Martin Won the Nike Opener, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 19, 1998, at G6, available at
1998 WL 8979183; Nightline, supra note 2.
25. See Meadows, supra note 24, at C4. Arnold Palmer, Ken Venturi, and Jack Nicklaus all
testified on behalf of the PGA, and opined that allowing Martin to use a golf cart would destroy
the integrity of the game. Id.
26. Brief for Petitioner at 15, 37, MartinIV, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001) (No. 00-24), availableat
2000 WL 1706732.
27. Id. at 30. The PGA argued that certain rules of the sport are "outcome-affecting," and if
these rules are eliminated or altered, the game of golf will be altered. Id. at 37. In addition, the
PGA argued that the "no-cart" rule is an integral part of professional golf and distinguishes highlevel professional competition from less elite competitions. Id.
28. Jeff Barnard, Martin and PGA Tour Calling Final Witnesses, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, Feb. 10, 1998, at C8, available at 1998 WL 5231944 (noting the widespread public
support for Martin during his first tournament using a golf cart).
29. See Morfit, supra note 24, at G6. Professional golfers such as Chi Chi Rodriguez, Brian
Henniger, and Eric Johnson stood behind Martin. Nightline, supra note 2.
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accommodation, 30 and that allowing him to use 3a1 cart does not
fundamentally alter the nature of the professional sport.
In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Stevens, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the district court and the Ninth
Circuit. 32 The Court held that PGA tournaments occur at places of
public accommodation under Title III, and that allowing Casey Martin
33
to use a golf cart does not fundamentally alter professional golf.
Justice Scalia, writing for dissent, disagreed and argued that the PGA's
golf tournaments do not take place at places of public accommodation,
alters the type of
and allowing Martin to use a golf cart fundamentally
"no-cart" competition that the PGA offers. 34
Because Casey Martin is the first physically disabled athlete to
successfully use the ADA in the arena of professional sports, his lawsuit
raises profound questions as to the limits of the ADA and the ability of
professional sports organizations to promulgate rules of play. 35 In
professional sports, which are intended to promote competition among
elite athletes, should accommodations be made for those who are
qualified, but physically disabled? 36 Furthermore, if a professional
sports organization must make an accommodation for a disabled athlete,
at what point37does that accommodation fundamentally alter the nature
of that sport?
This Note examines the broadened role of the ADA in the area of
professional sports. Part II of this Note begins with a discussion of the
ADA and the specific provisions of Title III, the title at issue in
Martin.38 Part II also examines prior precedent in the arena of

30. Brief for Respondent at 16, Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001) (No. 00-24), available at
2000 WL 1846091. A public accommodation is defined as anything other than a private entity.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(6) (1994).
31. Brief for Respondent at 35, Martin IV (No. 00-24). Casey Martin argued that the essential
aspect of golf is shot-making and not walking. Id. at 3 1. Martin reasoned that the Official Rules
of Golf do not prohibit the use of golf carts and that the PGA and other professional golf tours
allow the use of carts during certain competitions. Id. at 35-36.
32. Marlin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1883-84, 1898.
33. Id. at 1890, 1894-98.
34. Id. at 1898, 1901 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35. See Martin H, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1251 (D. Or. 1998), affid, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000),
aff'd, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001); see also infra Part V (discussing the impact that Martin could have
on professional sports).
36. See Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1884 (questioning whether modifications to the rules of golf
must be made in order to accommodate the disabled).
37. See Martin H, 994 F. Supp. at 1243. The district court questioned what type of rules could
be "modified to accommodate a disabled competitor." Id.
38. See infra Part II.A (outlining the history and specific provisions of the ADA).
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professional sports and ADA accommodations for disabled athletes. 39
Part II further canvases the history of the PGA and the rules of golf,4 0 as
well as Casey Martin's career as a disabled athlete. 4 1 Next, Part III
focuses on the district court,42 Ninth Circuit, 43 and United States
Supreme Court' opinions in Martin, where the Supreme Court
ultimately held that the PGA must accommodate Casey Martin's
45
disability by allowing him to use a golf cart during PGA competitions.
Part IV then provides an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision, and
argues that the Court correctly interpreted Title III of the ADA because:
(1) golf courses are specifically listed as places of public
accommodation under Title III; (2) a golf cart is a reasonable
accommodation of the "no-cart" rule for Casey Martin; and (3) allowing
Martin to use a golf cart will not fundamentally alter the competitive
nature of professional golf.46 Finally, Part V discusses the impact of the
Court's decision by hypothesizing that Martin will not have a drastic
effect on the future of professional sports, although the decision will
result in an increased administrative and financial burden for sports
47
organizations and the court system.
II. BACKGROUND
This Section will first outline the events leading up to the ADA and
its specific provisions. 4 8 Next, this Section will outline the application
of the ADA in high school, collegiate, and professional sports. 49 This
Section will then discuss the PGA, including its rules of qualification,
rules governing play during PGA tournaments, and the history of racial
and disability discrimination in professional golf. 50 Finally, this Section
39. See infra Part II.B (discussing how the lower courts have applied the ADA to disabled
athletes in high school sports, intercollegiate athletics, and professional sports).
40. See infra Part I.C (examining the PGA's rules for tour qualification, rules of play, and the
history of discrimination in professional golf).
41. See infra Part H.D (discussing Martin's disability and his history as a golfer).
42. See infra Part Hl.A (examining the district court's two part opinion).
43. See infra Part 111.B (outlining the Ninth Circuit opinion).
44. See infra Part III.C (examining the majority and dissenting opinions of the United States
Supreme Court).
45. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1897-98 (2001).
46. See infra Part IV (analyzing the majority's correct application of Title III).
47. See infra Part V (predicting that the Court's decision will result in an increased
administrative burden for professional sports and the court system).
48. See infra Part II.A (outlining the history of the ADA and specific provisions of the ADA).
49. See infra Part II.B (discussing the successes and failures of attempts by athletes to use the
ADA in the sports setting).
50. See infra Part II.C (examining the operations of the PGA and the history of discrimination
in professional golf).
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will review the life1 of Casey Martin and his battle to use a cart during
5
PGA tournaments.
A. The Americans with DisabilitiesAct (ADA)
Although the ADA was not the first statute enacted to prevent
discrimination against individuals with disabilities, 52 it was considered
the "first comprehensive declaration of equality" for disabled
Americans. 53 Utilizing pre-ADA statutes, as well as the ADA itself,
disabled amateur and professional athletes have experienced little
success in their attempts to seek the protections of the ADA. 54
1. Moving Toward the ADA
Prior to the enactment of the ADA, the federal government made
several attempts to eliminate discrimination against disabled
Americans. 55 The passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 marked the
first significant attempt by Congress to prevent discrimination based on
disability.5 6 Congress designed the Rehabilitation Act to prevent
discrimination against disabled contractors, government employees, and
recipients of federal grants, by denying federal aid to any activity that
discriminated against the disabled.5 7 It also required programs
51. See infra Part II.D (discussing Casey Martin's life, disability, and the beginnings of his
legal battle against the PGA).
52. See infra Part II.A.1 (outlining the pre-ADA statutes enacted in order to prevent disability
discrimination).
53. See infra Part II.A.2 (describing the provisions of the ADA).
54. See infra Part II.B (exploring disabled athletes' attempts to use the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA to prevent discrimination based on their disabilities).
55. See, e.g., Individuals with Disabilities Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1491 (1994), amended by
Pub. L. No. 106-402, § 401, 114 Stat. 1737 (requiring public schools to provide specialized
education programs to the disabled); Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157
(1994) (requiring buildings which are constructed, altered, or financed by the federal government
to be accessible to the disabled); Act of June 10, 1948, Pub. L. No. 617, ch. 434, 62 Stat. 351
(prohibiting employment discrimination based on physical handicaps within the Civil Service).
56. W.S. Miller, Ganden v. NCAA: How the NCAA's Efforts to Clean Up Its Image Have
Created an Ethical and Legal Dilemma, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 465, 467 (1997). Miller notes that
"the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was the first piece of legislation which treated disabled
Americans as a unified group, and not merely separate groups based upon a person's particular
disability." Id. Prior to the Rehabilitation Act, several pieces of legislation were enacted in order
to eliminate discrimination against the disabled. Id. at 466 n.9. These separate pieces of
legislation were aimed at protecting certain sectors of disabled individuals, but no single piece of
legislation benefited all disabled Americans until the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act, which
protected all disabled individuals associated with programs receiving federal aid. Id. at 467.
57. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994)). The Rehabilitation Act provides that no disabled individual "shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
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receiving federal aid to make reasonable accommodations for the
disabled, unless the accommodation would cause an undue burden to
the program. 58 Although the Rehabilitation Act represented a
successful step in eliminating discrimination against disabled
employees, it failed to include a large number of private sector
59
employees.
During the thirteen year span between the enactment of the
Rehabilitation Act and the passage of the ADA, Congress continued to
attack the problem of disability discrimination by adopting additional
legislation aimed at protecting disabled Americans. 6° Despite the
passage of these acts, discrimination against the disabled continued to
be a pervasive social problem permeating all areas of society, including
employment, housing, public accommodations, and transportation. 6 1 In

financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency ......
Id. A program or activity is defined as a department or agency, a college or university receiving
federal financial aid, and a corporation or partnership which is principally engaged in the business
of providing "education, health care, housing, social services, or parks and recreation." 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(b).
58. 29 C.F.R. § 32.13(a) (2001). The Interagency Disability Coordinating Council, the
council responsible for implementing and enforcing policies and regulations under the
Rehabilitation Act, promulgated this regulation. 29 U.S.C. § 794(c). In determining whether an
accommodation would cause an undue burden, the following factors can be taken into account:
the nature of the accommodation and its associated cost; the size of the program, including the
number of employees and the number of facilities; and the composition and structure of the
operation. Id.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b). The Rehabilitation Act only applies to programs that receive financial
assistance from the federal government. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Thus, many employees who work
in the private sector and students who attend private universities are not protected by the
Rehabilitation Act. See id.
60. See, e.g., Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §
1974 (1994); Developmental Disabilities Bill of Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6001 (1994),
repealed by Pub. L. No. 106-402, Title IV, § 401(a), 114 Stat. 1737 (2000); Air Carrier Access
Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374(c) (1994); see also Davis, supra note 11, at 5-6 (citing RUTH
COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 19 (1995)). The most significant of these
acts was the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, which required public schools at the K12 levels to provide "children with disabilities" with a formal, written "individualized education
program." 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1491 (1999). The individualized education plan must include a set
of goals that would allow the student to progress in the general education curriculum and requires
a determination of what special assistance will be necessary to meet these goals. 20 U.S.C. §
1414.
61. Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., HistoricalBackground of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 64
TEMP. L. REV. 387, 388-89 (1991). Weicker, the Senate co-sponsor of the ADA, stated that
"[d]espite the myriad of civil rights legislation on the books, people with disabilities remained
unprotected in many contexts in which federal laws prohibited other types of
discrimination-private employment, public accommodations, transportation, and state and local
activities and services." Id. at 389. Congressional findings determined that the disabled are a
"discrete and insular minority" who "occupy an inferior status in our society" are, politically
powerless, and have been subjected to unpurposeful treatment. Americans with Disabilities Act
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1990, Congress sought to expand the ability of the federal government
to protect the disabled by ensuring that the more than forty-three million
disabled Americans have full and equal opportunities, economic self62
sufficiency, and the chance to live independently.
2. The Development of the ADA
In order to expand the government's role in protecting the disabled,
Congress adopted the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990.63 The
stated purpose of the ADA is to eliminate discrimination against
individuals with disabilities while ensuring that the federal government
plays a role in enforcing the standards of the ADA.64 Specifically, the
ADA prohibits discrimination based on disability in employment,
programs and services provided by state and local governments, and
goods and services provided by private companies and commercial
facilities. 65 The ADA is currently codified into five titles that provide a
variety of comprehensive protections for the disabled. 66
67
Title I covers employment discrimination and prohibits employers
from discriminating against disabled individuals with respect to hiring,
promotion, termination, and any other privileges of employment. 68 In
order to establish a Title I violation, an individual must prove that he is
of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994). As a minority, the disabled have traditionally been
subjected to discrimination, intentional exclusion, and failure to make modifications to facilities
and practices, and segregation. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5). In the employment sector, Congress
found that approximately 8.2 million people with disabilities desired to work, but remained
unemployed because of discrimination. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 32 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314 (citing the ICD Survey of Disabled Americans: Bringing Disabled
Americans into the Mainstream). With respect to public accommodations, studies found that the
disabled did not frequent places of public accommodations due to past acts of discrimination and
architectural, communication, and transportation barriers. Id. at 34-37, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 316-18.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8). Congress sought to ensure "equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency" for the disabled. Id.
63. Robert Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Analysis and Implication of a
Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 413 (1991). At the
ADA signing ceremony, President George Herbert Walker Bush stated that the ADA was "the
world's first comprehensive declaration of equality for people with disabilities." Id. at 414.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(b)(2). Congress sought to provide consistent and enforceable
standards that would address discrimination against the disabled. Id.
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12213 (enumerating Titles I-V of the ADA).
67. 42 U.S.C. §§12111(5), 12112(2). Title I covers those who employ at least fifteen
employees, employment agencies, and labor organizations. Id.
68. 42 U.S.C. §§121 11-12117. Specifically, Title I prohibits discrimination "in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a).
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a qualified individual with a disability, and that he was excluded
because of a disability or the failure of an employer to make a
reasonable accommodation for the plaintiff's disability. 69 Thereafter, an
unless it would pose an undue
employer must make the accommodation
70
hardship on the employer.
Title II prohibits public entities from discriminating against qualified
individuals with a disability. 71 In addition, Title IV applies to
telecommunication and common carriers, requiring each to offer special
services for the hearing and speech impaired.72 Finally, Title V outlines
general anti-discrimination provisions, and more importantly, prohibits
retaliation against the disabled.7 3
3. Title III of the ADA
The ADA provision most applicable to the Martin decision is Title
III, which applies to services provided by public accommodations and
commercial facilities. 74 Specifically, Title III prohibits discrimination
against the disabled in the enjoyment of "goods, services, facilities,
69. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b). The ADA defines a disability as "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; a record of
such impairment; or being regarded as having such impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). A
reasonable accommodation includes making facilities readily accessible for the disabled or
providing "job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices ... and other similar
accommodations." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(b)(5)(A). An undue burden includes an action requiring either
"significant difficulty or expense." 42 U.S.C. §12111(10)(A). In determining whether a
requested accommodation imposes an undue burden, factors to be considered include: the nature
and cost of the accommodation; the financial resources of the employer in being able to make the
accommodation; and the type of business or operation from which the employee is requesting the
accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B). In Frank v. American Freight Systems, Inc., for
example, the Iowa Supreme Court held that it would be an undue burden for an employer to
restructure the job of a truck driver with a back ailment by hiring a second employee to load and
unload the goods that the truck driver could not handle. Frank v. Am. Freight Sys., Inc., 398
N.W.2d 797, 803 (Iowa 1987).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A public entity is defined as a state or local government, or a
department, agency or instrumentality of such government. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). Under Title
II, a qualified individual is specifically defined to include one "who, with or without reasonable
modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or
transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential
eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities
provided by a public entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12141-12165.
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213.
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189. A public accommodation is a private entity which "owns,
leases, (or leases to) or operates a place of public accommodation." 28 C.F.R. § 36.201 (2001).
A commercial facility is defined as a facility that is intended for non-public use and "whose
operations affect commerce." 42 U.S.C. § 12181(2).
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privileges, advantages or accommodations" by an owner, operator, or
lessor of a public accommodation. 75 The Department of Justice is given
the authority to implement the provisions of Title 111.76
In order to succeed under a Title III claim, a claimant must prove
three elements. 77 First, a plaintiff must prove that he has a qualifying
disability listed under the ADA. 78 Second, the plaintiff must establish
that the defendant owns, leases, or operates the place of public
accommodation. 79 Finally, a plaintiff must prove that he was
discriminated against on the basis of a disability in the equal enjoyment
facilities, privileges, advantages or
of "goods, services,
' 80
accommodations. "
A plaintiff must initially demonstrate that he suffers from a
qualifying disability in one of three ways. 8 1 An individual can have a
physical or mental impairment 82 that acts to substantially limit a major
life activity. 83 Alternatively, maintaining a record of such a physical or

75. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12188; 28 C.F.R. § 36.101. In order to implement Title 1II, the Department of
Justice issues regulations and guidelines under the Code of Federal Regulations. 28 C.F.R. §
36.101.
77. Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 480 (D. N.J. 1998) (identifying the three
requirements for a Title III claim); see also Shultz By & Through Shultz v. Hemet Youth Pony
League, 943 F. Supp. 1222, 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72, 78 (N.D.
Ohio 1994) (detailing a prima facie Title III case).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 480; see also infra notes 81-85 and
accompanying text (defining the requirement of a qualified disability).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 480; see also infra notes 87-88 and
accompanying text (detailing the public accommodations requirement).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 480; see also infra notes 89-92 and
accompanying text (defining the discrimination requirement).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
82. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1) (2001). The Department of Justice guidelines define a physical or
mental impairment as "any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
and specific learning
any mental or psychological disorder ...
anatomical loss ...
disabilities .. " Id.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). A major life activity includes "functions such as caring for one's
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working." 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(2). In determining whether a disability restricts a major life
activity, the "nature and severity of impairment, the duration or expected duration of the
impairment, and the permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment" is
considered. 28 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (2001).
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mental impairment can show a qualifying disability. 84 Finally, an
85
individual can ultimately be regarded as having such an impairment.
Upon establishing the disability, the plaintiff must then prove that the
86
defendant owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation.
Section 12181(7) delineates a detailed list of facilities that qualify as
places of public accommodation. 87 Most relevant to the Martin
decision, Title III specifically encompasses a golf course as a place of
public accommodation in section 12181(7)(L). 88
Finally, a disabled individual must prove that he has been
discriminated against in the equal enjoyment of "goods, services,
84. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Maintaining a record of an impairment includes having a "history
of, or being misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities." 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(3). Examples include individuals with a
history of mental or emotional illness, heart disease, and cancer. 28 C.F.R. § 36, app. B.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Being "regarded as" having an impairment is defined as a physical
or mental impairment which does not substantially limit a major life activity, an impairment
which only impairs a major life activity because of the attitude of others, or one who does not
have an impairment but is treated as having a physical or mental impairment by a private entity.
28 C.F.R. § 36.104(4).
86. Title III states that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of
disability ... in any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases
to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). A public accommodation is defined as:
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment located
within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and that is
actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the residence of such
proprietor;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition
or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other
sales or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe
repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy,
insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service
establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school, or
other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption
agency, or other social service center establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or
recreation.
Id.
88. Id. § 12181(7)(L).
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facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations." 8 9 Because the
PGA refused to modify the "no-cart" rule in order to allow Casey
Martin to use a golf cart, the relevant Title III discrimination provision
involves public accommodations which fail to make reasonable
accommodations when the accommodations are necessary to afford
goods, services, or accommodations to the disabled, unless the
modification would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service,
or accommodation. 90 Thus, under this definition of discrimination, the
91
plaintiff must prove that the requested accommodation is reasonable.
If the plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant must make the requested
accommodation, unless he can show that the accommodation would
fundamentally alter the public accommodation or impose an undue
92
administrative or financial burden.
Congress provided two exemptions from this three-prong test by
specifically exempting private clubs 9 3 and religious entities 94 from the
89. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (detailing a prima facie case for Title III);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv) (defining discrimination under Title III).
Second, a
public accommodation can discriminate by prohibiting disabled individuals from "fully and
equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations"
unless it can be shown that the criteria is necessary for the goods, service, or accommodation
being offered." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i). Third, a public accommodation discriminates by
failing to take the necessary steps to ensure that the disabled are provided with auxiliary aids and
services unless the aid or service would fundamentally alter the good, service, or accommodation
being offered. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). Finally, a public accommodation can
discriminate by failing to remove architectural, communication, and transportation barriers in
existing facilities and vehicles where such removal is "readily achievable." 42 U.S.C. §
12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
91. See Johnson v. Gambrinus Co., 116 F.3d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
claimant has the burden of proof to show that he actually requested an accommodation and that
the accommodation is reasonable). Although there is no statutory definition of a reasonable
accommodation, courts have consistently held that an accommodation is not reasonable if it either
imposes an undue financial and administrative burden on the defendant or if the accommodation
fundamentally alters the nature of the good or service being offered. See, e.g., Sch. Bd. v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987); Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1035 (8th
Cir. 1994) (holding that undue administrative and financial burdens are not reasonable
accommodations); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (stating that an accommodation is not
reasonable when it fundamentally alters the good or service being provided by the public
accommodation).
92. Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1059.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (exempting private clubs from Title III prohibitions). Neither Congress
nor the courts have defined a private club. In Wright v. Cork Club, a civil rights case, the
Southern District of Texas stated that "there is no single definition of 'private club.' Courts
consider a multitude of factors, no one of which is dispositive." Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F.
Supp. 1143, 1150 (S.D. Tex. 1970). Furthermore, the ADA itself does not provide a statutory
definition of a private club. 42 U.S.C. § 12187. Rather, courts have used a balancing test which
considers seven factors: genuine selectivity, membership control, history of the organization, use
of the facility by non-members, purpose of the club, whether the club advertises for new
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scope of Title 111. 95 However, because the ADA does not specifically
exempt professional sports from its scope, athletes have sought to use
Title III to prevent sports organizations and rule-making bodies from
discriminating against the disabled.9 6
B. The ADA in the Sports Setting
Although Casey Martin is the first athlete to successfully sue a
professional sports organization under the ADA, 97 he was not the first
litigant to utilize the ADA in the sports arena. 98 Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Martin, athletes used the ADA to challenge rulemaking bodies at the high school, 99 intercollegiate," and professional

members, and non-profit club status. United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785,
796 (E.D. Pa. 1989), affd, 894 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1990).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (exempting religious establishments from Title III prohibitions). A
religious entity is defined as a "religious organization, including a place of worship." 42 U.S.C. §
12187; 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2001). White v. Denver Seminary was the first case to address the
scope of the religious entity definition. White v. Denver Seminary, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1173
(D. Colo. 2001). In White, a learning disabled student filed a Title II action against the Denver
Seminary for, among other things, requiring him to enter into a learning contract and mandating
that he take medication for his disability. Id. at 1172. In holding that the seminary was a
religious organization, the court stated that the religious entity exemption is "very broad,
encompassing a wide variety of situations. Religious organizations and entities controlled by
religious organizations have no obligations under the ADA. Even when a religious organization
carries out activities that would otherwise make it a public accommodation, the religious
organization is exempt from ADA coverage." Id. at 1174 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.104).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (exempting private clubs and religious establishments).
96. Prior to the enactment of the ADA, the only congressional discussion involving the ADA
and professional sports occurred during a floor debate surrounding the ADA's effects on the drug
testing policies of professional sports organizations. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1), at 80 (1990).
Through Title I, Congress sought to prevent employers who require pre-employment drug testing
from discriminating against disabled individuals who take prescribed medication for a disability
but who choose not to disclose their medical condition prior to employment. Id. Floor debate on
this issue concerned whether Title I's drug testing policy complied with the policies already in
place in professional sports organizations. Id. Ultimately, Congress agreed that the ADA was in
compliance with these drug testing policies. Id. The report stated that the ADA is not intended to
"disturb the legitimate and reasonable disciplinary rules and procedures established and enforced
by professional sports leagues." Id.
97. See Davis, supra note 11, at 25 (noting that Martin "was the first to apply federal
disability laws to professional sports").
98. See infra Part II.B.1-3 (outlining the use of the ADA in high school sports, collegiate
athletics, and professional sports).
99. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing how high school athletes have attempted to utilize the
ADA in order to gain exemptions from high school age eligibility requirements).
100. See infra Part II.B.2 (outlining the unsuccessful attempts to use the ADA by college
athletes who were denied the ability to play collegiate sports due to their disability).
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sports levels. I0 1 These challenges, however, met with varying degrees
02
of success. 1
1. High School Sports
Disabled high school students have attempted to use the ADA in
order to gain exemptions from athletic age requirements, but have met
with mixed results. 10 3 High school athletic associations set age
eligibility requirements in order to prohibit high school students
nineteen years of age and older from participating in high school
sports. 1°4 Age eligibility requirements are designed to protect younger
and presumably smaller players from injury, and to guard against
competitive advantages by older athletes. 10 5 These age eligibility rules,
however, consistently collide with athletes who are held back in school
because of a disability, and therefore become too old to play high school
06
sports. 1
When challenged by these students, courts initially waived the age
eligibility requirement and required the high school to accommodate the
disabled individual. 10 7 Today, however, the courts are split with respect
101. See infra Part II.B.3 (noting both successful and unsuccessful attempts to use the ADA
by professional athletes against professional sports organizations).
102. See infra notes 103-23 and accompanying text (outlining the mixed results disabled
student athletes experience when attempting to obtain waivers of high school age eligibility
requirements).
103. See, e.g., Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1035 (6th Cir.
1995) (refusing to grant a waiver of an age eligibility rule); Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch.
Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 931 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the age eligibility rule could not
be waived without fundamentally altering the purpose of the rule); Dennin v. Conn.
Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 663, 669 (D. Conn. 1996), vacated as
moot, 94 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that the purpose of an age eligibility rule is not
undermined by granting a learning disabled athlete a waiver); Interscholastic League v.
Buchanen, 848 S.W.2d 298, 301-02 (Tex. App. 1993) (waiving the age eligibility rule for a
disabled athlete because the purpose of the rule would not be undermined by granting a waiver).
104. See Julia A. Kasperski, Comment, Disabled High School Athletes and the Right to
Participate:Are Age Waivers Reasonable Modifications Under the Rehabilitation Act and the
Americans with Disabilities Act?, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 175, 186-92 (1997) (discussing the
purpose of age eligibility requirements).
105. Id. at 186. Athletes who delay their education or intentionally repeat a grade in order to
become more athletically mature may gain a competitive advantage over younger, less athletically
mature players. Id.
106. See, e.g., Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1035; Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 931; Dennin, 913 F. Supp. at
669; Buchanen, 848 S.W.2d at 301-02.
107. See Buchanen, 848 S.W.2d at 301-02. In Buchanen, the plaintiff had a learning disability
that held him back in school, rendering him ineligible to play football due to the school's age
eligibility requirement. Id. at 300. After the organization that regulated competitive high school
athletics refused to grant Buchanen a waiver, he filed suit under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. The
court, in waiving the age requirement for Buchanen, held that an individual assessment must be
used. Id. at 301-02. The court stated that the purpose of the age eligibility rule was not to
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to the application of age eligibility rules to disabled athletes. 10 8 The
deciding factor is whether or not the court conducts an individualized
inquiry to determine whether the waiver of an age eligibility rule is a
reasonable accommodation under Title I1I.109
Courts that do not conduct an individualized inquiry under Title III
are unlikely to require school districts to waive age eligibility
requirements. 1 0 For example, in Pottgen v. Missouri State High School
Activities Ass'n, the Eighth Circuit rejected an individualized inquiry
approach and held that any modification of an age eligibility
requirement constitutes a fundamental alteration of the nature of age
eligibility rules.'
Pottgen was a baseball player who was forced to
repeat two grades because of his learning disability.' 1 2 By the time
Pottgen reached his senior year in high school, he was nineteen and
restricted from playing baseball by a high school association by-law that
precluded nineteen-year-old students from participating in
113
interscholastic sports.
After the school association denied Pottgen a waiver, he filed 14a
lawsuit under the Rehabilitation Act and Title III of the ADA."
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit held that an individualized inquiry is
inappropriate because individualized assessments impose an undue
administrative and financial burden on a defendant and the court
prevent disabled students from participating in high school sports. Id. at 302. Because Buchanen
had a learning disability, Buchanen was held back due to his disability and not in order to gain a
competitive advantage. Id. In this case, because Buchanen was of average size, and was not
intentionally held back in order to gain an athletic advantage, the court held that Buchanen must
be granted a waiver to play high school football. Id.
108. Compare Dennin, 913 F. Supp. at 666, and Buchanen, 848 S.W.2d at 301-02 (using an
individualized determination in granting a disabled athlete a waiver of the age eligibility rule),
with Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1035, and Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 931 (using a generalized inquiry in
holding that an eligibility rule fundamentally alters the rule's purpose).
109. See infra note 110 and accompanying text (noting that a claimant is normally only
successful when the court adopts an individualized inquiry approach).
110. Compare Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1026, and Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 931(using a generalized
requirement in refusing to waive age eligibility requirements), with Dennin, 913 F. Supp. at 666
(using an individualized inquiry in waiving an age eligibility requirement).
I 11. Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 929-30.
112. Id. at 927-28. After Pottgen's elementary school diagnosed him with several learning
disabilities, Pottgen was placed on an individualized program that allowed him to progress at a
normal rate and prevented him from being held back further. Id. at 928.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 928-29. The court held that Pottgen could not prevail under the Rehabilitation Act
because Pottgen was not a qualified individual under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 930. The
court held that the Rehabilitation Act protects only those individuals who are potentially able to
meet the eligibility requirements of a program or activity. Id. Because Pottgen was nineteen and
could never meet the age eligibility rule, he was not a qualified individual and was therefore not
protected under the Rehabilitation Act. Id.
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system. 15 In holding that Pottgen did not have a qualifying disability
under the ADA, the court held that an age eligibility rule is essential to
high school sports. 16 Because age eligibility rules are essential, the
court held that a reasonable accommodation cannot be made in order
to
117
accommodate a student who can no longer meet the age requirement.
Contrary to Pottgen, a district court judge in Connecticut used an
individualized assessment to hold that a similar age-eligibility rule
violated the ADA. 1 8 In Dennin v Connecticut InterscholasticAthletic
Conference, Inc., a nineteen-year-old student with Down's syndrome
sought a waiver of a high school eligibility rule so that he could
participate on his school's swim team.1 19 After he was denied a waiver,
he filed suit under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. 120 The district
court held that the age eligibility requirement violated the ADA, and
stated that the purpose of the rule was not frustrated by waiving the age
restriction rule for an individual who was not attempting to gain a
competitive edge. 12 1 Furthermore, an individualized assessment would
not pose an undue burden on the high school athletic league. 122 Thus,
the plaintiff was successful in seeking an exemption to the age
eligibility rule in23 Interscholastic League, although most plaintiffs are
1
not so fortunate.

115. Id. at 931. In ruling against an individualized inquiry, the court stated that an entity
could never know the outer bound of "services, programs or activities." Id. As a result, the entity
would have to create a "fact-finding mechanism" each time an individual seeks a waiver of a
program requirement. Id.
116. Id. The court held that the age eligibility rule was "of immense importance in any
interscholastic sports program" because it reduces competitive advantage, protects younger
athletes from potential harm, and discourages red-shirting. Id.
117. Id. at 929-30. The Eighth Circuit stated that since Pottgen was already older than
nineteen, the only possible accommodation would be to waive the age restriction. Id. at 930.
Because Pottgen could never meet the eligibility restriction and no method existed to satisfy the
age limit, he was not a qualified individual with a disability. Id.
118. Dennin v. Conn. Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 663, 666 (D.
Conn. 1996), vacated as moot, 94 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996).
119. Id. Due to his Down's syndrome, Dennin was forced to spend an extra year in junior
high, rendering him nineteen before the start of his senior year of high school. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 669-70. Because Dennin was known to be the slowest swimmer on the team and
was not intentionally held back in order to gain a competitive advantage, the court held that a
waiver would not fundamentally alter the age eligibility rule. Id. at 669.
122. Id. The court held that the defendant would not to be flooded with applicants seeking a
waiver of the age eligibility rules because the league is not required to grant a waiver to all
applicants who cannot meet the age requirements, only disabled applicants. Id.
123. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (citing cases where plaintiffs were
unsuccessful in seeking waivers of age eligibility rules).
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2. Collegiate Athletics
In the arena of collegiate sports, few plaintiffs have successfully
utilized the ADA to challenge colleges and universities.1 24 Instead,
courts have held that a disabled athlete's ability to play collegiate sports
is not a major life activity, and therefore does not qualify for protection
under the ADA. 125 In Knapp v. Northwestern University, the Seventh
Circuit held that athletic sports did not constitute a major life activity
for a collegiate student athlete. 126 Knapp was a basketball player who
suffered a heart attack in his high school gym prior to attending
Northwestern University. 127 As a result of his heart attack, a
defibrillator was implanted into Knapp's stomach. 128 At Northwestern,
Knapp was allowed to travel with the basketball team, but was not
allowed to practice or compete. 129 After Knapp filed a lawsuit against
Northwestern, the district court held that Knapp's ailment impaired a
major life activity for Knapp, playing basketball. 130
Because a
defibrillator was a reasonable accommodation and effective in
preventing further complications for Knapp, the court held that the
university violated the ADA by not allowing Knapp to compete on the
team. 13 1 The Seventh Circuit reversed, however, and held that Knapp
was not disabled because not playing basketball did not substantially
limit Knapp's major life activity of learning while at the university. 132

124. See infra notes 125-39 and accompanying text (citing examples where collegiate athletes
have unsuccessfully challenged colleges and universities under the ADA).
125. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 481-82 (7th Cir. 1996).
126. Id.; see also supra note 83 and accompanying text (defining a major life activity).
127. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 942 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (N.D. Ill. 1996), rev'd, 101 F.3d
473 (7th Cir. 1996). The school was aware of Knapp's condition prior to Knapp signing a
National Letter of Intent to attend Northwestern. Id.
128. Id. The automatic defibrillator was placed in Knapp's stomach in order to restart his
heart if Knapp were to have another heart attack. Id. The defibrillator acts to recognize an
irregular heart arrhythmia and restore the arrhythmia to normal. Id. at 1194-95.
129. Id. at 1194. Northwestern's team physician rendered Knapp medically ineligible to play
basketball based upon Knapp's medical record, medical guidelines, and consultation with other
physicians. Id.
130. Id. at 1195. The district court stated that intercollegiate sports played a major role in
Knapp's educational process and helped instill discipline, confidence, leadership, and teamwork.
Id. Thus, playing basketball for Knapp is a major life activity. Id.
131. Id. at 1198.
132. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 481-82 (7th Cir. 1996); see also supra note
83 and accompanying text (defining a major life activity). Using a generalized analysis, the
Seventh Circuit held that playing intercollegiate sports does not deprive the majority of college
students from being able to learn and succeed in college. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 480. Furthermore,
under an individualized inquiry, Knapp's ability to learn is not substantially limited by not being
allowed to play intercollegiate basketball, as Knapp still is able to retain his scholarship at the
university and can fulfill a role on the basketball team other than as a basketball player. Id. at
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Similar to age eligibility requirements in high school athletics, courts
have held that academic core-course requirements are essential
requirements in intercollegiate athletics.' 33 In Bowers v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, a prospective football player for Temple
University suffered from a learning disability. 134 As a result of his
learning disability, Bowers took special education courses in high
school, and therefore, was unable to meet the NCAA established corecourse requirements. 135 Bowers filed suit under Title III of the ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act, seeking a waiver of the core course
requirement. 136 Finding in favor of the NCAA, the court held that
137
academic eligibility rules are an essential part of collegiate athletics.
The court noted that Bowers asked for the elimination of the corecourse requirement, not simply a modification as required by the
ADA. 138 Thus, the court concluded that because academic eligibility
rules are essential, abandoning the core-course requirement would
fundamentally alter the nature of the NCAA's programs. 139 As a
consequence of this holding, athletes have subsequently been
unsuccessful in gaining protection from the ADA in college athletics.
3. Sports Organizations and Associations
Finally, litigants seeking the protection of Title III against a sports
organization have been largely unsuccessful in arguing that the

481. Similarly, in Pahulu v. University of Kansas, a football player was disqualified from
participating with the team after team doctors discovered that he had a "congenitally narrow
cervical canal" which created an increased risk of neurological injury. Pahulu v. Univ. of Kan.,
897 F. Supp. 1387, 1388 (D. Kan. 1995). Pahulu subsequently filed suit under the Rehabilitation
Act. Id. Although the court in Pahulu held that playing sports may be a major life activity for a
college athlete, disqualifying Pahulu from playing with the team did not act to substantially limit
his ability to learn. Id. at 1393. The court reasoned that Pahulu was still able to retain the benefit
of an athletic scholarship and participate on his team in other roles. Id.
133. Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 974 F. Supp. 459 (D. N.J. 1997).
134. Id. at 462.
135. Id. Because Bowers had satisfied only three of the required thirteen core-courses, the
NCAA declared him ineligible to play football. Id. at 463. A core-course is defined as a
"recognized academic course that offers fundamental instruction components in a specified area
of study." Id. at 461. As a general matter, remedial and special education courses are specifically
excluded from meeting the core-course requirements. Id.
136. Id. at 463.
137. Id. at 467. The court held that the core-course requirement is essential because its
purpose is to maintain collegiate sports as an integral part of an athlete's academic program, and
ensures that athletes progress in their educational plans. Id. at 466.
138. Id. The court stated that "[p]laintiff seeks a virtual elimination of the 'core course'
requirement, rather than merely the 'modification' or 'accommodation' required by the ADA."
Id.
139. Id.
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organization is a public accommodation. 140 In Stoutenborough v.
National Football League, 14 1 a hearing-impaired individual filed suit
against the NFL due to a blackout rule, which prohibited the television
broadcast of home football games. 142 Specifically, Stoutenborough
argued that the blackout rule violated Title III by discriminating against
hearing impaired individuals, because a television broadcast was the
only way for the hearing impaired to take in the game. 143 In rejecting
Stoutenborough's claim, the Sixth Circuit held that an NFL broadcast
does not amount to a public accommodation under the ADA. 144 The
court noted that neither the NFL nor a sports league is listed as a public
accommodation under Title Il. 145 Furthermore, the NFL is not a
facility even though games are played in arenas, which are places of
public accommodation under Title 111.146 Because both the hearing and
hearing-impaired fans are prohibited from viewing the game under the
blackout rule, the NFL did not discriminate against the hearing
47
impaired. 1
Similarly, in Brown v. Tenet ParaAmerica,148 the Northern District of
Illinois held that a group organizing a bicycle race was not a public
accommodation under Title 111.149 In Brown, a cross-country bicycle
tour required all competitors to wear helmets. 150 Brown, a paraplegic,
argued that the design of his tricycle was linked to his disability and was

140. See infra notes 141-60 and accompanying text (outlining attempts to use Title III against
professional sports and professional associations).
141. Stoutenborough v. Nat'l Football League, 59 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995).
142. Id. at 581-82.
143. Id. Stoutenborough claimed that the blackout rule violated Title III because the rule
deprived the hearing impaired of "substantially equal" access to the game, a service offered by a
public accommodation. Id. at 582.
144. Id. at 583. Similar to the ruling in Stoutenborough, a district court has held that a hockey
league is not a public accommodation under Title II. Ellitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217,
223 (E.D. Mo. 1996). In Ellitt, a child diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder filed a Title III
action against a hockey organization when the league refused to allow a family member to be on
the ice with Elliott during practices in order to keep the child "focused." Id. at 218. The court
held that a hockey league was not a place of public accommodation because the league was a
membership organization, which is not sufficiently similar to any of the twelve public
accommodations in Title III. Id. at 223; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994) (defining a public
accommodation).
145. Stoutenborough, 59 F.3d at 583. Furthermore, the court reasoned that viewing a blackedout football broadcast was a service that did not involve a place of public accommodation. Id.
146. Id. However, the Sixth Circuit held that the NFL's buildings, parking lots, and places
owned by the NFL are covered under Title I. Id.
147. Id. at 582.
148. Brown v. Tenet ParaAmerica, 959 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. I11.1997).
149. Id. at 499.
150. Id. at 497.
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not conducive to the use of a helmet. 151 In denying Brown's claim
under Title III, the court held that Title III was not applicable to the
organizers of the bike
race because they were not an "association" or
"organizing group."' 152
Recently, however, some courts have expressed a willingness to
expand the definition of a public accommodation. 153 In Anderson v.
Little League, the United States District Court for Arizona held that the
Little League is a public accommodation subject to Title III. 154 In
Anderson, a baseball coach who used a wheelchair claimed that the
Little League violated Title III of the ADA when it passed a rule
forbidding individuals in wheelchairs from coaching Little League
games.' 55 The court, in applying an individualized determination, held
that the Little League violated Title 111.156 The court reasoned that
Little League baseball falls within Title III because the Little League
operates places of public accommodation. 157 However, notwithstanding
a victory in Anderson, most litigants have been unsuccessful in their
58
suits against sports organizations.1
In conclusion, disabled Americans have been largely unsuccessful in
159
their attempts to seek the protections of the ADA in the sports arena.

15I. Id. at499.
152. Id. The court held that as an organizing group, the defendant was not a public
accommodation. Id. at 498. Furthermore, the court pointed out that although the bicycle tour
took place on public roads, public roads are not places of public accommodation because they are
not "operated, owned, or leased by a private entity." Id. at 499.
153. See Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 344 (D. Ariz. 1992).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 343-44. Anderson had coached Little League baseball for three years prior to the
adoption of the rule forbidding individuals in wheelchairs from coaching. Id. at 343. The Little
League claimed this rule was to protect the safety of the players. Id. at 344.
156. Id. at 345. The court stated that the Little League's policy "amounts to an absolute
ban ... regardless of the coach's disability. Regrettably, such a policy-implemented without
public discourse-falls markedly short of the requirement enunciated in the Americans with
Disabilities Act." Id. The court relied on the fact that Anderson had coached for three years
without experiencing any problems. Id. Furthermore, the court held that by being allowed to
coach, Anderson will be able to benefit the young players by providing them with an example of
how to overcome a personal challenge. Id.
157. Id. at 344.
158. See supra notes 140-58 and accompanying text (discussing ineffective efforts to seek
protection under the ADA against professional sports organizations).
159. See supra notes 103-58 and accompanying text (outlining the largely unsuccessful
challenges brought by disabled Americans in amateur and professional sports).
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Prior to Casey Martin's suit, no litigant 16attempted to utilize the ADA
against the Professional Golf Association. 0
C. The ProfessionalGolf Association
The Professional Golf Association (PGA) is a golf association whose
players have the opportunity to earn millions of dollars and become
instant celebrities. 16 1 Because the PGA offers elite golf tournaments,
competitors seeking entrance to a PGA tournament must first qualify for
the privilege to play. 162 During qualification and throughout
participation in a PGA tournament, competitors are required to abide by
numerous rules. 163 However, since the beginnings of professional golf
in America, categories of golfers have been denied the opportunity to
compete. 164 Most recently, the disabled have been the subject of this
65
discrimination. 1
1. Qualifying for the PGA Tour
More than three centuries after golf was developed in the United
States, 166 the Professional Golf Association was formed. 167 The PGA is

160. Davis, supra note 11, at 3. Although the PGA has been the subject of several lawsuits,
Casey Martin was the first claimant to file an ADA action against the PGA. Id. (noting that
Martin "was the first to apply federal disability laws to professional sports").
161. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001) (No. 00-24), availableat
2000 WL 1706732. The PGA states that "these elite tournaments ... test the ability of
professional golfers to perform at the highest level of golf competition." Id. Tiger Woods is the
most notable example of a professional golfer who has been successful in the game and has
gained celebrity status. Gary Smith, The Chosen: Tiger Woods was Raised to Believe that his
Destiny is not only to be the Greatest Golfer Ever, but also to Change the World. Will the
Pressures of Celebrity Grind Him Down First?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 23, 1996, at 28,
available at 1996 WL 12549456.
162. See infra Part Il.C.1 (defining how a player can gain access to a PGA tournament).
163. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the rules governing competition during PGA
tournaments).
164. See infra Part H.C.3 (noting the PGA's long history of discrimination).
165. See infra Part II.C.4 (discussing Ford Olinger and his struggle to use a golf cart during
the U.S. Open tournament).
166. Davis, supra note 11, at 27 (citing AL BARKOW, GOLF'S GOLDEN GRIND: THE HISTORY
OF THE TOUR 28 (1974)). Although it is unknown where and when golf first began as a sport, it
is thought that golf began in Scotland in the mid-1400s. LARRY DENNIS, A BEGINNER'S GUIDE
TO GOLF 5 (1994). At its beginnings, a normal round of golf did not consist of eighteen holes,
but varied depending upon the amount of land that was available for the course. Id. at 6. The
game of golf, as it is known today, did not take shape until the eighteenth century. Id. Golf came
to the United States during the 1700s, but it wasn't until the late 1800s when golf took off as an
American sport. Id.
167. Davis, supra note 11, at 28 (citing AL BARKOW, GOLF'S GOLDEN GRIND: THE HISTORY
OF THE TOUR 56 (1974)). Thirty-five chartered members founded the PGA in New York in 1916,
after a number of amateur golf professionals met to discuss the feasibility of forming a national
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a non-profit organization whose purpose is to promote golf tournaments
for PGA members and to further the professional golf careers and
interests of PGA members. 168 Consistent with this mission, the PGA
conducts three professional golf tours each year: the PGA Tour; 169 the
Buy.com Tour; 170 and the Senior PGA Tour. 171 PGA events typically
include four days of competition played on golf courses that are owned
or leased by the PGA, and often72 require golfers to walk twenty to
twenty-five miles per competition. 1
There are three ways of gaining entry into the PGA Tour. 173 First, a
competitor who wins three events on the Buy.com Tour in the same
year, or is among the top fifteen money winners on the Buy.com Tour,
will be given an opportunity to play on the PGA Tour. 174 Secondly, a
competitor can gain entry into a PGA Tour tournament through the open
qualifying rounds, which are typically conducted one week before a
PGA competition, and generally allow a competitor to use a golf cart.175
The third and most common way of gaining entry into the PGA Tour is
through the qualifying school, commonly known as the Q-School. 76 In
order to compete in the Q-School, a competitor must have two

association for golf professionals. PGA of America, Chronology of Events 1916-1919, at
http://www.pga.org/FAQ/History/chronoIgy-l.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2002).
168. Brief for Respondent at 2, Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001) (No. 00-24), available at
2000 WL 1706762 (citing PGA Tour's Concise Statement of Material Facts, Dec. 24, 1997, at 3).
From its inception, the mission of the PGA has been to: promote interest in golf; protect the
interests of PGA members; and offer tournaments for the benefit of members. PGA Links,
History of the PGA of America, at http://www.pgalinks.com/pro/history.cfm (last visited Feb. 1,
2002).
169. The United States PGA Tour is the world's biggest and richest professional golf tour.
Worldbook Encyclopedia, PGA and Pro Golf, available at http://www2.worldbook.com//
features/golf/html/golf.htm (last modified Jan. 9, 2002). The Tour offers annual prize money in
excess of $130 million to approximately 200 players who compete. Id.; Martin 1, 984 F. Supp.
1320, 1321 (D. Or. 1998).
170. Approximately 170 players compete on the Buy.com Tour on an annual basis. Martin I,
984 F. Supp. at 1321. The Buy.com Tour was known as the Nike Tour during Martin's lawsuit.
Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1884 n.l (2001). This Note will, at all times, refer to the former Nike
Tour by its current name, the Buy.com Tour.
171. Martin I, 984 F. Supp. at 1320. In order to qualify for the Senior PGA Tour, a golfer
must be fifty years of age or older. Brief for Petitioner at 3 n.2, Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879
(2001) (No. 00-24), available at 2000 WL 1706732.
172. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1884; Brief for Petitioner at 4, Martin IV (No. 00-24).
173. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1884; Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. at 1321.
174. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1884.
175. Id. at 1884-85.
176. Id. at 1884; Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. at 1321.
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recommendations and pay a $3000 entry fee. 177 The first two rounds of
the Q-School consist of seventy-two holes per round. 178 The third
round consists of 108 holes. 179 However, unlike the first two rounds,
80
which allow the use of golf carts, players must walk and use a caddie
during the third round of the Q-School. 181 After the third round, thirtyfive of the lowest scoring competitors receive a spot on the PGA
82
Tour.1
2. Rules Governing Play
183
Players must abide by numerous rules during a PGA competition.
184
Three major sources of rules govern play during PGA tournaments.
The primary source of rules are the Official Rules of Golf promulgated
by the United States Golf Association (USGA) and the Royal and
Ancient Golf Club of St. Andrews, Scotland. 185 The Official Rules of
Golf define golf as "playing a ball from the teeing ground into the hole
186
by a stroke or successive strokes in accordance with the Rules."'
Amateurs and professionals worldwide, as well as the PGA, USGA,' 87
177. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1884. A qualifier is required to get two recommendations from a
member of the PGA Tour. Brief for Respondent at 3, Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001) (No. 0024), availableat 2000 WL 1846091.
178. Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. at 1321. Although a normal round of golf consists of eighteen
holes, Rule 2-3 of the official Rules of Golf specifically states that a match can consist of a
stipulated round. UNITED STATES GOLF ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 24.
179. Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. at 1321.
180. UNITED STATES GOLF ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 10. A caddie is defined as "one
who carries or handles a player's clubs during play and otherwise assists him in accordance with
the Rules." Id.
181. Martin 1,984 F. Supp. at 1322.
182. Id. at 1321-22. The next seventy lowest scorers are given an opportunity to play on the
Buy.com Tour. Id. at 1321.
183. Initially, golf was a sport without any official rules. DENNIS, supra note 166, at 6.
184. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1884 (2001); Brief for Petitioner at 4 n.3, Martin IV, 121 S.
Ct. 1879 (2001) (No. 00-24), available at 2000 WL 1706732; UNITED STATES GOLF
ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 6.
185. See United States Golf Association, For the Good of the Game, at http://www.usga.org/
about/good of the__game.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2002) [hereinafter For the Good of the Game].
In cooperation with the Royal and Ancient Golf Club of St. Andrews, the United States Golf
Association writes and interprets the Rules of Golf in order to "guard the tradition and integrity of
the game." Id.
186. UNITED STATES GOLF ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 23.
187. For the Good of the Game, supra note 185. The USGA is a private, non-profit
association created "for the purpose of promoting and conserving throughout the United States
the best interests and the true spirit of the game of golf as embodied in its ancient and honorable
traditions." Barry A. White et al., Brief of the United States Golf Association as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Appellant, 1 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 110, 111 (1999). The USGA has been the United
State's national governing body of golf since 1894, when it was founded in an effort to conduct
national championships and improve the game's integrity. DENNIS, supra note 166, at 6-7; For
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and the Ladies Professional Golf Association (LPGA) utilize these
188
rules.
The Official Rules of Golf do not specifically prohibit the use of a
cart or require players to walk during a competition.' 8 9 However, Rule
33-1 authorizes the committee overseeing a tournament, such as the
PGA, to set forth optional conditions of the game, which are listed in
the appendix to the Official Rules of Golf. 19° Appendix I to the Rules
states that "if it is desired to require players to walk in a competition,
the following condition is suggested: 'Players shall walk at all times
during a stipulated round." ' 19 1
A second source of rules governing golf competitions is the
"Conditions of Competition and Local Rules," also known as the hard
card. 192 The PGA Tour and Buy.com Tour hard cards apply to all
events on their respective tours, and require all competitors to walk
unless they are competing in an open qualifying round. 193 Finally, the
committee in charge of a competition issues "Notices to Competitors"
to all players before a tournament, and these notices only cover a
specific tournament. 194 For example, a notice might authorize the use
of a cart to speed up play when there is a long distance between
holes. 195 Thus, although the Official Rules of Golf do not specifically
the Good of the Game, supra note 185. In addition to co-writing and interpreting the Rules of
Golf, the USGA conducts thirteen annual championships (the U.S. Open, the U.S. Women's
Open, the U.S. Senior Open, and ten national amateur and state team championships).
188. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1884. The LPGA, founded in 1950, is the "longest running
women's professional sports organization in the world" whose purpose is to promote and advance
women's golf. LADIES PROFESSIONAL GOLF ASSOCIATION, LPGA'S GUIDE TO EVERY SHOT 187
(2000).
189. See UNITED STATES GOLF ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 23-121 (outlining the rules of
play). The Rules do not specifically require a player to walk the course between holes, nor do
they prohibit the use of motorized devices, such as a golf cart. See id.
190. Id. at 144. The Rules of Golf include local rules that are made by a local committee. Id.
at 118.
191. Id. at 149.
192. Brief for Petitioner at 4 n.3, Martin IV, 121 S.Ct. 1879 (2001) (No. 00-24), available at
2000 WL 1706732. The PGA creates and issues the hard card rules for each of the three tours
that are offered by the PGA. Id. at 3-4. As an example, a rule dictated in the hard card prohibits
competitors from using golf balls which do not conform to USGA standards. Id. at 4 n.4.
193. Id. at 4. The PGA's "hard card" requires that "[p]layers shall walk at all times during a
stipulated round unless permitted to ride by the PGA Tour Rules Committee." Id. at 5 n.5. The
hard card for the Buy.com Tour contains virtually the same language. Id. The PGA Rules
Committee may permit players to use a cart for safety reasons, in order to avoid requiring them to
cross a street, or when the configuration of the course does not make it feasible for them to walk.
Id.
194. Id. at 4 n.3.
195. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1885 (2001). Other examples include notices of how the
Rules should be applied to a water hazard or a man-made obstruction on the course. Id.
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prohibit carts, the PGA is 196able to use the hard card to prohibit
competitors from using a cart.
3. History of Discrimination
Since the beginnings of golf in the United States, there have been
several disputes relating to discrimination.' 97 These disputes have
centered around racial discrimination 198 and discrimination based on
disability.' 99 Racial discrimination has been evident in golf since the
creation of professional golf in America. 2°° For example, the PGA's
original constitution required that all players be Caucasian. 20 ' Black
applicants were consistently denied membership to the PGA, resulting
in anger and humiliation, as well as difficulty maintaining their status as
professionals. 20 2 This type of racial discrimination continued until
1961, when the "Caucasian Only" clause was removed from the PGA's
constitution. 20 3 However, the removal of the clause was not the end of
racial discrimination, as the first black male was not invited to play in
the Masters Tournament until 1975.204 Racial discrimination continued
to be evident in the PGA through the 1990s. 20 5 Most recently, in 1997,
professional golfer Fuzzy Zoeller commented that Tiger Woods, upon
196. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (detailing the rules governing play during a
professional golf tournament).
197. See infra notes 198-214 and accompanying text (noting how the PGA has discriminated
in the areas of race and disability).
198. See infra notes 200-07 and accompanying text (exploring the racial discrimination that
has been evident in the PGA).
199. See infra notes 208-14 and accompanying text (outlining professional golf's involvement
with disability discrimination).
200. See CALVIN H. SINNETTE, FORBIDDEN FAIRWAYS: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE
GAME OF GOLF 122 (1998). For example, in 1928, two African-American golfers took legal
action against the USGA after they were disqualified from competing in a USGA sponsored
tournament. Id. The men were successful, and the tournament was suspended until the men were
reinstated by the USGA. Id. The men were subsequently reinstated, but withdrew from the
tournament having proved their point. Id.
201. Id. at 125. Section One of Article II of the PGA constitution stated that membership in
the association was limited to "Professional Golfers of the Caucasian race." Id.
202. Id. Without membership in the PGA, African-American players were denied the large
tournament money that only went along with a PGA tournament. Id. Because African-American
golfers were denied access to all but three white tournaments in the mid-1940s, players had a
difficult time maintaining their skills as professionals. Id.
203. Davis, supra note 11, at 29.
204. Id. Lee Elder was the first African-American player to be invited to the Master's
Tournament. Dave Hannigan, Driving Out Prejudice,SUNDAY HERALD (Scotland), Feb. 4, 2001,
at 17, available at 2001 WL 8470385.
205. See John Leland, From the Rough. Disabled Golfer Denied Use of a Golf Cart During
Qualifying Tournament, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 9, 1998, at 48, available at 1998 WL 9578186. The
PGA continued to frequent clubs that barred African-Americans up until the 1990s. Id.
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winning the Master's Tournament, would likely be serving up the
stereotypical black staple of "fried chicken and collard greens" at the
Champion's dinner. 20 6 Thus, racism continues to invade professional
20 7
golf.
Beyond racial discrimination, disability discrimination has plagued
professional golf.20 8 In fact, Casey Martin's request to use a golf cart
was not the first time that professional golf tackled the issue of deciding
whether to allow a disabled player to use a golf cart.2 °9 In 1987, the
PGA denied Charlie Owens, a player who sustained an injury in a
2 10
parachuting accident, the use of a cart for the 1987 Senior Open.
Owens walked the first nine holes on crutches in protest of the denial
and then withdrew from the tournament.2 11 Similarly, the PGA denied
Lee Elders the use of a cart for the 1995 Senior Open after he suffered a
heart attack.2 12 However, in the 1990s, players such as Paul Asinger
and Scott Verplank, professional golfers suffering from cancer and
diabetes, respectively, chose to walk without requesting the use of a
cart.213 Most recently, Ford Olinger and Casey Martin, both suffering
from debilitating diseases, requested the use of a cart and, like those
2 14
before them, were denied by the USGA and the PGA.
4. Ford Olinger
Ford Olinger is a professional golfer afflicted with bilateral avascular
necrosis, a degenerative condition that significantly impairs his ability
to walk.215 In 1998, Olinger petitioned the USGA for the right to use a

206. Hannigan, supra note 204, at 17. In commenting on Zoeller's statement, Woods declared
"I forgive him but I can't forget." Id.
207. See id.
208. See infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text (outlining how professional golf has
discriminated against the disabled).
209. Morfit, supra note 24, at G6. Since 1986, the USGA has had thirteen requests from
individuals desiring to use a golf cart during a PGA event. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n,
205 F.3d 1001, 1003 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated, 121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001).
210. Morfit, supra note 24, at G6.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Davis, supra note 11, at 30. Asinger continued to walk the course despite battling the
effects of chemotherapy. id. Prior to Martin's case, Scott Verplank chose to walk rather than ask
to use a cart even though he suffers from diabetes. See Nightline, supra note 2.
214. See infra Parts HI.C.4, III.D (discussing Ford Olinger and Casey Martin's struggle to use
a cart during professional golf tournaments).
215. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1003 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated, 121
S. Ct. 2212 (2001). Due to Olinger's disability, he can no longer walk an entire round of golf.
Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 55 F. Supp. 2d 926, 929 (N.D. Ind. 1999), aff'd, 205 F.3d
1001 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated, 121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001).
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golf cart during the qualifying rounds of the U.S. Open. 2 16 Like those
2 17
before him requesting the use of a cart, the USGA denied his request.
Thereafter, Olinger filed an action under the ADA. 2 18 The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted
Olinger a temporary restraining order, allowing him to utilize a cart in
his attempt to qualify for the U.S. Open. 219 After a full trial, the district
court ruled against Olinger. 220 First, the court held that the golf course
operated by the USGA was a place of public accommodation under
Title 111.221 Second, the district court ruled that allowing Olinger to
utilize a golf cart would fundamentally alter the nature of the
competition.2 22
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district
court. 223 The court assumed that the USGA was an operator of a place
of public accommodation, and chose instead to decide the case on

216. Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1004.
217. Id. Since 1895, only one player has used a cart while competing in the U.S. Open. Id. at
1003.
218. Id.
219. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 929. The temporary restraining order was granted after the
court found that excluding Olinger from the qualifying rounds would have meant that he could
not participate in the 1998 U.S. Open and that the U.S. Open had previously made arrangements
so that Casey Martin would be allowed to use a cart during qualifying. Id. at 929 n. 1. Despite the
district court's order, Olinger did not fare well, and failed to make it to the second round of
qualifying for the Open. Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1004.
220. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 928.
221. Id. at 931-32. The court held that the USGA itself cannot be a public accommodation
because it is a membership organization, thus falling out of Title III's definition of a public
accommodation. Id. at 931. However, as the lessor and operator of golf courses which are used
for the U.S. Open and qualifying, the USGA is an operator of a place of public accommodation.
Id. While operating these courses, the USGA restricts the normal operation of the course and
reserves the course to its competitors. Id. Thus, Title m applies to the USGA as an operator of a
place of public accommodation. Id. at 933.
222. Id. at 934. In ruling on the reasonableness of allowing Olinger to use a cart, the court
stated that "the golf cart has become so ubiquitous in the sport that any such challenge (to the
reasonableness of using a golf cart) would seem doomed." Id.; see also supra note 91 (defining a
reasonable accommodation). In holding that a cart would fundamentally alter the nature of the
championship, the court concluded that allowing a player to use a golf cart would provide a
player with a competitive advantage. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 935. Citing a report by an expert
in the physiology of walking, the court stated that an able-bodied golfer who uses a cart on the
average summer day "has a significant and unfair advantage over an average able-bodied 25-35
year-old golfer who is walking. The person who walks the course under those conditions
performs the same amount of physiologic work as if he had run 11-minute miles for 2.5 hours."
id. Furthermore, removing walking would remove stamina from the qualities to be tested during
a competition. Id. at 934.
223. Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1007.
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whether a cart fundamentally alters the nature of the U.S. Open. 224 In
holding that Olinger's request would fundamentally alter the nature of
the golf competition, the Seventh Circuit accepted the findings of the
district court that riding fundamentally alters the nature of the U.S.
Open by removing stamina from the game. 225 Although it might seem
that Ford Olinger's case is a rare one in which a disabled golfer is able
to make it to the top ranks of professional golf, Olinger's case is oddly
226
similar to that of another disabled golfer, Casey Martin.
D. Casey Martin
Casey Martin was diagnosed with Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber
syndrome, 227 a rare circulatory disorder, at the age of three. 228 This
permanent, progressive deformity causes blood to pool in Martin's
lower right leg. 229 As blood pools in his leg, Martin's entire leg from
the hip down becomes swollen and disfigured. 230 Because Martin lacks
224. Id. at 1005. The Seventh Circuit stated that while there was some logic to the contention
that the USGA does not operate a place of public accommodation, "we hesitate to embrace it for
we can resolve this appeal ... on a more narrow ground." Id.
225. Id. at 1006-07. The Seventh Circuit relied on the district court's holding that using a cart
removes stamina from the game and the fatigue, heat, and humidity associated with the game
would be of lesser importance in the game. Id. at 1006; Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 937. The
court also agreed with the district court's holding that waiving the "no-cart" rule would force the
USGA to "develop a system and a fund of expertise to determine whether a given applicant truly
needs, or merely wants, or could use but does not need, to ride a cart to compete." Olinger, 205
F.3d at 1007; Olinger,55 F. Supp. 2d at 937.
226. See infra Part H.D (outlining Martin's struggle to utilize a cart in the PGA Tour).
227. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1885 (2001). Klippel-Trenaunay- Weber syndrome is a
vascular disorder characterized by a birth mark, varicose veins, and bony and soft tissue
enlargement or atrophy in an extremity. Sturge-Weber Foundation, Health and Wellness: KTWhat is It?, at http://www.sturge-weber.com/aboutkt.htm (last modified Aug. 20, 2001).
Bleeding, skin infections, and significant amounts of pain are also associated with this disease.
Id. However, each case of the disease is different, with patients exhibiting varying abnormalities
and degrees of severity. Id. While enlargement of one or more limbs is the most common
ailment with this disease, atrophy of the affected limb can also occur. Id. Both of these
symptoms impair the ability of the limb to function normally, often times affecting a person's
mobility. Id. In rare instances, amputation of the affected limb may be necessary. Id.
228. Nightline, supra note 2; Brief for Respondent at I n.I, Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001)
(No. 00-24), available at 2000 WL 1846091. Martin's disease is so rare that only 1000 cases are
known to exist in the world. Nightline, supra note 2.
229. Garrity, supra note 15, at G10. Blood in Martin's leg is able to circulate to his right leg,
but a blockage at his knee prevents recirculation of the blood back to the heart. Nightline, supra
note 2.
230. Martin 11, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1243 (D. Or. 1998), aff'd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000),
affd, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001). Because of the swelling in Martin's leg, he must wear a double set
of specially designed support stockings in order to remain upright. Id.; see also Nightline, supra
note 2 (discussing Casey Martin's need to wear a stocking to reduce the swelling in his right leg).
Compression garments worn on the afflicted limb are a common form of treatment which is used
to reduce stress and swelling in the limb. Sturge-Weber Foundation, supra note 227.
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a normal circulatory system in his leg, his bones below the knee have
23 1
become weak and brittle, resulting in severe atrophy of his right leg.
Not only is walking painful for Martin, but it also places him at
significant health risks, including the development of blood clots,
fracturing of his tibia, and the possible need for amputation above his
232
right knee.
Despite his susceptibility to a wide range of medical problems, Casey
Martin started playing sports at an early age. 233 Martin first began to
play golf at the age of six, while utilizing a splint to support his right
leg.234 He also developed into a star shooter on his sixth and seventh
grade basketball teams. 235 Martin's athleticism caused significant
problems, however, and the strain on his leg eventually eroded the
cartilage in Martin's right knee. 236 His condition did not stop Martin's
athletic pursuits, and as a young golfer Martin won seventeen amateur
237
championships before the age of fifteen.
During his collegiate years from 1990 to 1995, Martin attended
Stanford University on a golf scholarship, where he became a two-time
Academic All American. 238 While at Stanford, Martin's condition
worsened.2 39 Initially, Martin wore a splint on his right leg to help ease

231. Brief for Respondent at 1, Martin IV (No. 00-24), available at 2000 WL 1846091; see
also Nightline, supra note 2. Martin's orthopedic surgeon describes Martin's right knee as "that
of a 70- or 80-year-old," making it nearly impossible for him to play golf. Garrity, supra note 15,
at G10.
232. Martin 11, 994 F. Supp. at 1243. Should Martin stumble or fall, amputation would almost
certainly be necessary because of the loss of bone stock and atrophy of the tibia which has
occurred during Martin's lifetime. Garrity, supra note 15, at GI0; Christopher M. Parent, Note,
Martin v. PGA Tour: Misapplication of the American with DisabilitiesAct, 26 J. LEGIS. 123, 132
(2000). Casey Martin stated that his right leg has prevented him from "living a normal life."
Thomas Health, Martin Gives Emotional Testimony in Courtroom; Golfer Recounts Pain From
Leg Disorder,WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 5, 1998, at C1, available at 1998 WL 2466034. Martin
states that his leg has caused him "such immense pain that he has been unable to sleep
uninterrupted for many years" and that he takes at least five Advils a day, and "no longer runs,
exercises or drives." Id.
233. See Morfit, supra note 24, at G6.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. Despite the pain and disability associated with Martin's illness, Martin often chose to
walk rather than use a cart. Id.
238. Brief for Respondent at 1, Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001) (No. 00-24), available at
2000 WL 1706762. While at Stanford, Martin studied economics, tutored Hispanic youth,
studied the Bible, and was even known to play the piano at fraternity parties. Garrity, supra note
15, at G10.
239. Morfit, supra note 24, at G6.
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the discomfort, but after developing shinsplints, 240 Martin was left with
two alternatives: walk in pain or request that the NCAA allow him to
use a cart during competitions. 24 1 Martin thereafter requested
permission to use a cart during the 1994 NCAA championship, and both
the NCAA and Pacific 10 Conference gave him permission to use a cart
242 where Martin led his team
for the remainder of his collegiate career,
24 3
championship.
to the NCAA national
After graduating from Stanford, Martin turned professional and
played on the Hooters Mini-Tour 244 for two years, where tour officials
prohibited the use of carts. 245 Despite his success on the Hooter's MiniTour, Martin occasionally chose to play on the Tommy Armour MiniTour2 46 because it allowed the use of carts.2 47 After playing on the
Hooters Mini-Tour for two years, Casey Martin entered the PGA's QSchool tournament. 248 Martin played well in the first two rounds, and
utilized a cart as allowed by the PGA rules. 249 Before the third round,
Martin requested to use a cart, and submitted medical data as evidence
of his disability. 250 After the PGA commissioner denied Martin's
request, Martin filed a lawsuit against the PGA. 25 1 He sought an
injunction under the ADA that would require the PGA to waive the "nocart" rule for the third round of the Q-School tournament, the Buy.com

240. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1751-52 (18th ed. 1997). Shinsplints are
defined as "pain in the anterior, posterior, or posterolateral compartment of the tibia." Id.
Shinsplints usually occur following "strenuous or repetitive exercise." Id.
241. Morfit, supra 24, at G6.
242. Id.; Garrity, supra note 15, at GI0.
243. Davis, supra note 11, at 32.
244. NGA Hooters Tour, Tour History, at http://ngahooterstour.com/history.html (last
modified Aug. 15, 2001). The Hooters Tour is a development tour designed to provide a chance
to "compete in a professional atmosphere as well as achieve financial success." Id.
245. Morfit, supra note 24, at G6. To deal with the fact that he could not use a cart, Martin
often curtailed his schedule, competing for a few weeks and then resting his leg. Id.
246. The Tommy Armour Mini-Tour was a professional tour designed to provide aspiring
golfers who did not make a PGA Tour a chance to compete at the professional level. Alan Byrd,
Trainingfor the Top: Local Mini-Tour Helps Develop Golfers, PrepareThem for the PGA Tour
(Mar. 21, 1997), at http://orlando.bizjournals.com/orlando/stories/1997/03/24/focusl.html (last
visited Feb. 1, 2002).
247. Morfit, supra note 24, at G6.
248. See id.
249. Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (D. Or. 1998), aff'd, 204 F. 3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000),
aff'd, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001).
250. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1886 (2001). Because Martin was able to use a cart during
the first two rounds of the Q-School, he did not request the use of a cart until the third round.
Martin I, 984 F. Supp. at 1322.
251. Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. at 1322.
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Tour, and the PGA Tour. 252 After a preliminary injunction was granted,
which allowed Martin to use a cart for the third round of the Q-School,
3
Martin played well enough to qualify for the Buy.com Tour. 25
Thereafter, the stage was set for Casey Martin's legal battle.254

III. DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Martin was the culmination of a
long legal battle in which Casey Martin sought the protection of the
ADA in order to compete on the PGA Tour. 255 The United States
District Court for the District of Oregon, as well as the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held that the PGA violated Title
III by not allowing Casey Martin to use a golf cart. 256 Despite
successfully petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari, the PGA fared
no better, and found themselves faced with a 7-2 decision in favor of
257
Martin and a strong dissent written by Justice Scalia.
A. DistrictCourt: Motion for Summary Judgment and
Dispositive Opinion
In a two-part opinion, the United States District Court for the District
of Oregon held that the PGA's "no-cart" rule violated Title III of the
ADA.2 58 Martin filed his suit under the main premise2 59 that the PGA,

252. Id.
253. Id. Casey Martin missed qualifying for the PGA Tour by two strokes. Davis, supra note
11, at 33 (citing Peter Keratosis, PGA's Rule Takes Martinfor a Ride, FLORIDA TODAY, Jan. 18,
1998, at 1C). Thereafter, a stipulation was reached between the PGA and Casey Martin where
Martin was allowed to use a cart during the first two rounds of the Buy.com Tour. Morfit, supra
note 24, at G6. Martin won the first Buy.com Tour event he played in, beating his nearest
competitor by one stroke. Id.
254. See infra Part I (discussing Martin's legal battle against the PGA).
255. See Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. at 1322.
256. See infra Part ILI.A (discussing the holding and reasoning of the district court's opinion
in Martin); see infra Part Il.B (outlining the Ninth Circuit's opinion).
257. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1883, 1889, 1898, 1902 (2001); see also infra Part III.C.l
(outlining the majority's opinion); Part HI.C.2 (discussing the dissenting opinion).
258. Martin I, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1252 (D. Or. 1998), aff'd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000),
aff'd, 121 S.Ct. 1879 (2001). The district court issued two opinions in Martin, a ruling on the
PGA's motion for summary judgement and the dispositive opinion. Id.; Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. at
1326. For purposes of this Note, both opinions will be combined.
259. Martin 1,984 F. Supp. at 1323. As part of his Title ImIclaim, Martin argued that the PGA
was subject to the requirement that any person offering licensing or credentialing must do so in a
manner accessible to the disabled. Id. In addition to the Title HI claim, Martin also argued that
Title I applied. Id. As an employer, Martin argued that the PGA "is prohibited from
discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability ... in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
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as a private entity which owns or operates a place of public
accommodation, violated Title III of the ADA. 26
In response to
Martin's claim, the PGA moved for summary judgment and claimed
that the ADA does not apply to PGA tournaments. 26 1 The PGA argued
that it was not a place of public accommodation because it was exempt
from Title III as a private entity. 2 62 In addition, the PGA argued that it
was a "mixed use" facility, where the areas inside the competition are
not subject to Title III because they are not available to the general
public. 263 Alternatively, the PGA asserted that even if it constituted a
public accommodation, allowing the use of a golf cart would
264
fundamentally alter the nature of the golf game.
In ruling on Martin's Title III claim, 265 the district court applied a
seven factor balancing test to reject the PGA's argument that as a
private club, it was exempt from Title 111.266 Specifically, the court
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §
12112(a) (1994)); see also supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (outlining Title I).
260. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994); Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. at 1323. A public accommodation
must make a reasonable modification for Martin unless the modification would fundamentally
alter the nature of the accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182; see also supra notes 90-92 and
accompanying text (outlining a reasonable accommodation).
261. Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. at 1323. In response to Martin's Title I claim, the PGA argued
that Martin was not an employee of the PGA Tour. Id.
262. Id. The PGA claimed that it was a non-profit organization, which should be exempted
under Title III
as a private club. Id.
263. Id. at 1326. A "mixed use" facility argument states that certain accommodations are
composed of different zones, only some of which are available to the public. Id. Areas that are
available to the public are considered public accommodations under Title III. Id. However, areas
which are not available to the public are not public accommodations, and thus inapplicable to
Title III.
Id.
264. Martin II, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Or. 1998), aff'd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000),
aff'd, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001). This defense was based on the argument that Title III does not
require an entity to make an accommodation for the disabled if the modification would
fundamentally alter the nature of its program. See id.; see also supra notes 91-92 and
accompanying text (outlining when an owner or operator of a place of public accommodation
does not have to make an accommodation for an individual's disability).
265. Martin I, 994 F. Supp. at 1247. Judge Coffin quickly rejected Martin's Title I claim that
the PGA was an employer, as well as the argument that the PGA is an entity offering courses and
examinations. Id. Specifically, the court stated "Ireject (without detailed elaboration) plaintiffs
claims that he is a PGA Tour employee and that the [Buy.com Tour] is a 'course or examination'
under the Act." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994)).
266. Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. at 1324-26. The seven factor balancing test includes
consideration of: genuine selectivity, amount of membership control, history of organization, use
by non-members, purpose of the club, advertising for membership, and non-profit status. Id.
Under the genuine selectivity factor, consideration is given to whether the club screens out
members based on "social, moral, spiritual, or philosophical beliefs." Id. at 1325 (citing Quijano
v. Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1980)). The membership control factor looks
at the amount of control that members possess in deciding who is able to join the club. Id. The
history of the organization determines whether the organization was formed as a "sham" to
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noted that the PGA is a nonprofit entity organized to generate revenue
for its employees and was not the type of interest Congress sought to
protect under the private club exemption. 267 The court also determined
that PGA tournaments were not limited to PGA members, 268 and that
the private club exemption was not designed to protect the PGA's
269
ability to select members based on athletic skill.
After holding that the PGA was not exempt from Title III as a private
club, the district court held that the PGA Tour was a place of public
accommodation subject to Title III. 270 The court relied on the fact that
a golf course is specifically included in the definition of a public
accommodation under Title 111.271 In holding that PGA tournaments are
public accommodations, the court rejected the PGA's argument that its
tournaments were mixed-use facilities where the areas inside the ropes
were not part of a public accommodation because these areas were not
accessible to the public. 272 In rejecting this claim, the court pointed out
prevent a sector of the population from joining, or whether the club is a "bona fide" organization.
Id. The non-member use prong determines the extent to which non-members are allowed access
to the club, as reliance on non-members for revenue or use of membership amenities will weigh
against private club status. Id. Under the club's purpose factor, a mercantile purpose for a club
will weigh against private club status. Id. In analyzing whether the club advertises for new
membership, organizations that advertise for new members cannot fall within the private club
exemption. Id. Finally, under the non-profit status prong, the fact that an organization is nonprofit will not be enough for private club status if the organization's purpose is to create revenue
for its members. Id.
267. Id. at 1326. Non-profit status does not mean that an entity will be exempted under Title
III. Id. at 1324 (citing Quijano, 617 F.2d at 131, 133). In this case, the court held that
"generating revenue for its members scarcely seems to qualify as the type of protectable interest
Congress had in mind when it excluded private clubs from coverage." Id.
268. Id. at 1325. A large number of non-members are allowed access to Tour events,
including vendors, scorekeepers, and the media. Id. In addition, the court held that a large degree
of non-membership use exists because the PGA relies on the public to generate revenue. Id. The
court cited Smith v. YMCA, where the Fifth Circuit held that the YMCA could not be a private
club because it enjoyed a large amount of revenue from the general public. Id. (citing Smith v.
YMCA, 462 F.2d 634, 648 (5th Cir. 1972)).
269. Id. at 1324-25. The court held that traditional selectivity revolves around "social, moral,
spiritual, or philosophical beliefs," and not the natural "weeding out" of individuals which is
inherent at the top level of professional sports. Id. at 1325.
270. Id. at 1326.
271. Id. Title III specifically includes a "golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation"
in the definition of Title III. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (1994).
272. Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. at 1327. The PGA contended that "since the public gallery is not
allowed inside the playing area, the fairways and greens of its golf courses are not places of
public accommodation." Id. at 1326. The PGA analogized a golf course to a baseball stadium,
where the bleachers where subject to Title III, but the dugout is not because the public cannot
access the dugout. Id. at 1327. In rejecting this argument, the district court subsequently relied
on Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arenas Corp., where the court held that the executive
suites of a sports arena are subject to Title Ili even though they are not available to the public. Id.
(citing Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arenas Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698 (D. Or. 1997)).
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that people who are not PGA Tour members are given access to the
areas of the course inside the rope, including caddies, thus rendering the
273
PGA's mixed use argument inapplicable.
After determining that the PGA was a place of public
accommodation, the district court considered whether allowing Martin
to use a golf cart would be a reasonable accommodation under the
ADA. 274 The court held that Martin successfully demonstrated that
using a golf cart was reasonable considering the nature of the game of
golf. 275 Furthermore, golf carts are used in other PGA events, such as
certain rounds of the Q-School and the Senior PGA Tour, and the
NCAA and Pacific 10 Conference allow carts to be used in order to
276
accommodate a disabled player.
Finally, the court addressed whether a modification of the "no-cart"
rule fundamentally alters the nature of a PGA tournament. 277 The
district court held that a court must make an individualized
determination rather than a generalized inquiry into the nature of the
accommodation. 278 Thus, the court's role was not to determine if
waiving the "no-cart" rule would give a normal golfer an advantage, but
whether it would specifically give Casey Martin an advantage over
other golfers. 279 The court held that the use of a cart was a necessary

273. Id. at 1327.
274. Martin H, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1247 (D. Or. 1998), aff'd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000),
aff'd, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001); see also notes 90-92 and accompanying text (defining Title III's
requirement of a reasonable accommodation).
275. Martin H, 994 F. Supp. at 1249. The court reasoned that the official Rules of Golf do not
require a player to walk the course. Id.
276. Id. The court also relied on the fact that the when the PGA allows carts to be used, it
imposes no handicap system when a player chooses to utilize a cart. Id.
277. Martin 11, 994 F. Supp. at 1248; see also supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text
(outlining when a modification fundamentally alters the nature of a good or privilege).
278. Martin H, 994 F. Supp. at 1249. The court cited Johnson v. Gambrinus Co. in stating
that "the type of evidence [which] satisfies" the burden of proving a reasonable accommodation
"focuses on the specifics of the plaintiff's or defendant's circumstances and not on the general
nature of the accommodation." Id. (quoting Johnson v. Gambrinus Co., 116 F.3d 1052, 1059 (5th
Cir. 1997)). In Johnson, a blind man who used the aid of a guide dog filed suit against a brewery
company who refused to allow him to take a public tour of the brewery with the aid of his guide
dog. Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1056. Johnson filed suit under Title III of the ADA. Id. In
determining which party had the burden of proof in showing that a reasonable accommodation
had been requested, the court held that the plaintiff has the burden of proof in showing that he
requested an accommodation and that the accommodation is reasonable. Id. at 1059. The court
held that because a service animal was a reasonable accommodation, Johnson must be allowed
access to the brewery tour using the aid of his guide dog. Id. at 1064.
279. See Martin I1, 994 F. Supp. at 1249.
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requirement for Martin in order to provide him with an opportunity to
280
compete in PGA tournaments.
Although the court accepted the PGA's argument that the purpose of
the "no-cart" rule is to inject fatigue into the game, the court held that
walking is not a significant element of golf under normal
circumstances. 28 1 First, the body of the Official Rules of Golf do not
specifically require golfers to walk the course. 282 Second, the court
accepted the testimony of experts in psychology and fatigue who stated
283
that the fatigue created from walking a round of golf is insignificant.
Rather than being oppressive, the fatigue related to walking the course
is considered low intensity exercise, causing psychological and not
physical exhaustion. 284 Thus, although walking a round of golf created
an element of fatigue in the game, the fatigue of the average player was
285
not nearly as high as what Martin must deal with in playing golf.
Because Title III applies to the PGA, and Martin had successfully
shown that a waiver of the "no-cart" rule was a reasonable
accommodation that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the
game, the district court granted Martin a permanent injunction, allowing
286
Martin to use a cart during tour and qualifying events.

280. Id. at 1253. During the hearing, Martin's doctor testified that Martin had previously
made several unsuccessful attempts to use artificial devices, such as shoe inserts and various
braces, in an effort to play without the use of a cart. Id. at 1250.
281. Id. at 1250.
282. Id. at 1249. The court stated that nothing in the Rules defines walking as part of the
game or requires players to walk. Id. Rather, it is the optional provisions in the Appendix where
a PGA specific rule requires players to walk unless permitted to use a cart by the PGA Rules
Committee. Id.; see also supra notes 183-96 and accompanying text (outlining the Rules of Golf
by which PGA professionals must abide).
283. Martin 1I, 994 F. Supp. at 1250. Expert testimony indicated that the calories expended
during a round of golf are less than the total calories in a McDonald's Big Mac, and are expended
during a five hour period, where the slow pace of the game and frequent opportunities to rest can
easily replace the lost calories. Id. In determining that walking was an insignificant element of
the game, the court also pointed to the fact that most golfers prefer to walk even if given a chance
to ride. Id. at 1251. Thus, walking could not be a significant and oppressive element in the game
if golfers would choose to walk. Id.
284. Id. The court stated that walking five miles during a golf tournament is not as
physiologically exhausting as a "a requirement of running, or even walking 5 miles at a
continuous gait." Id. at 1251 n.12.
285. Id. at 1251. Judge Coffin noted that Martin is not completely free from walking the
course even with a cart. Id. With a cart, Martin must still walk one-quarter of the course during a
round of golf. Id.
286. Id. at 1253.
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B. Ninth Circuit Opinion
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court, and held
that PGA tournaments are places of public accommodation and that
allowing Casey Martin to use a golf cart would not fundamentally alter
the nature of the sport. 287 Although the PGA declined to appeal the
district court's holding that it was not a private entity, the PGA asserted
new defenses as to why its tournaments were not public
accommodations. 288 Specifically, the PGA argued that its golf courses
are not places of exercise or recreation because the players are
competing in order to win money. 289 In addition, the PGA argued that
Title III is inapplicable because the PGA's competitions are not open to
the public.

290

In holding that the PGA operated a place of public accommodation,
the Ninth Circuit stated that a golf course is unambiguously a public
accommodation. 29 1 In so holding, the Ninth Circuit rejected the PGA's
mixed use facility argument that the areas of competition are not open
to the public and thus not public accommodations, stating that the
argument too narrowly construed the definition of a public
accommodation. 292 In addition, the court stated that the mixed-use
have held
facility argument was inconsistent with cases where courts 293
stands.
the
just
not
and
field
playing
the
to
applies
III
that Title

287. Martin 111, 204 F.3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir. 2000), affd, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001).
288. Id. at 997-99. The PGA also continued to argue that it operated a mixed-use facility. Id.
at 998.
289. Id. at 997. The PGA stated that under the definition of a public accommodation, a golf
course is listed with "other place[s] of exercise or recreation." Id. However, the PGA argued its
golf courses do not fall within this definition because PGA courses are not used as places of
recreation, but are used in order to make money. Id.
290. Id. Under this approach, the PGA claimed that its golf courses are not places of public
accommodation because they are restricted to the best golfers, and hence not open to the public.
Id.
291. id. at 997. In addition, the court held that if a PGA tournament does not fall under the
definition of a golf course, then it qualifies as a "place of exhibition or entertainment." Id.
292. Id.; see also supra note 263 and accompanying text (explaining the PGA's "mixed use"
facility argument). The court noted that members of the general public who are not competitors,
such as caddies and the media, are allowed inside the course. Martin 111, 204 F.3d at 997
293. Id. at 998; see, e.g., Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (E.D. Mo. 1998);
Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 344 (D. Ariz. 1992). In Tatum, a
learning disabled student filed an ADA action against the NCAA when it refused to recognize an
untimed ACT score in determining Tatum's eligibility to participate in intercollegiate sports.
Tatum, 992 F. Supp. at 1116. In holding that Title III applied to the NCAA, the court reasoned
that the NCAA exerted control over the operations of stadiums and auditoriums, and in the case
of championships, leases facilities. Id. at 1119-21; see also supra notes 154-58 and
accompanying text (stating that the Little League is a public accommodation under Title III as an
operator of a baseball competition).
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The Ninth Circuit also rejected the PGA's contention that its
competition was not open to the public, and thus not subject to Title
111.294 The court stated that being selective in choosing competitors is
irrelevant, and thus a facility does not lose its status as a public
accommodation merely because entry to the facility is limited. 295 The
court held that the Q-School is clearly a public accommodation because
it is an open competition. 296 Thus, PGA Tours can be no less of a
public accommodation once the PGA restricts competition to the best
297
athletes.
Upon holding that a PGA tournament is a public accommodation, the
Ninth Circuit then concluded that Casey Martin's use of a cart is a
reasonable accommodation under Title 111.298 Specifically, the Ninth
Circuit noted that a cart allows Martin to access golf tournaments and
299
poses minimal difficulty for the PGA in accommodating this request.
Furthermore, the court noted that the PGA allows golfers to use carts
3
during certain other competitions. 00
Third, the Ninth Circuit stated that allowing the use of golf carts does
not fundamentally alter the nature of golf. 30 1 Because it concluded that
walking is not fundamental to the game of golf, the court rejected the
PGA's argument that waiving a substantive sports rule always amounts
to a fundamental alteration of the game. 30 2 Agreeing with the district

294. Martin 111, 204 F.3d at 998. The PGA argued that its tournaments cannot take place on
places of public accommodations because they are restricted to the best golfers, and not the
public. Id.
295. Id. at 998-99. In stating that selectivity is irrelevant, the court analogized to elite
universities that are selective in choosing whom to admit to the university. Id. at 998. The court
stated that while those schools are highly selective, it does not mean that the students who are
admitted to the university cannot utilize Title m. Id.
296. Id. at 999. The court stated that the Q-School was available to the public because anyone
with $3000 and two recommendations has the opportunity to compete. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 999-1000.
299. Id. at 999. The court held that it was both reasonable and necessary to allow Martin to
use a golf cart. Id. A cart is reasonable in that it solves Martin's access to the competition. Id.
Allowing Martin to use a cart is also necessary, as Martin's disability makes it nearly impossible
for him to walk the course. Id.
300. Id. at 1000.
301. Id. at 1000-02. The court affirmed an individualized inquiry approach in deciding
whether a golf cart is a fundamental alteration of the game. Id. at 1002. The court reasoned that
the PGA failed to show that an individualized inquiry acts as an "intolerable" burden to the PGA.
Id.
302. Id. at 1000-01. The PGA argued that once a rule is determined to be substantive because
it may affect the outcome of the sport, a modification of the rule would alter the nature of the
game. Id. In defending this argument, the court stated that Title III does not prohibit all
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court, the Ninth Circuit held that that the game of golf does not require
walking, and noted that the PGA does not consider walking to be
essential to golf as golf carts are allowed on the Senior Tour and the
the
first two rounds of the Q-School.3 °3 In addition, the court accepted
30 4
district court's findings that fatigue is insignificant to the game.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected the PGA's argument that allowing
Martin to use a golf cart gives him a competitive advantage. 30 5 The
court noted that Martin must not only walk one quarter of the course
with a cart, but also must endure significant pain and stress while
getting in and out of the cart. 306 In addition, Martin does not gain any
advantage in shot making, which is ultimately where a golf tournament
is won or lost. 30 7 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that allowing Martin
to use a golf cart is not a fundamental alteration, but merely permits
Martin access to a type of competition in which he otherwise would not
Title
be able to engage. 30 8 Thus, the court held that the PGA violated
30 9
competitions.
during
cart
a
use
to
Martin
allowing
not
by
III
C. United States Supreme Court Opinion
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Martin 3in
10
order to resolve a circuit split between the Seventh and Ninth circuits. 3 11
The Supreme Court faced two issues in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin.
First, the Court sought to determine whether the ADA protects access to

alterations of a good or service, but only those which fundamentally alter the nature of the good
or service. Id.
303. Id. at 999. Like the district court, the Circuit Court held that walking was not essential to
the game of golf and found that the Official Rules of Golf do not specifically require a player to
994 F. Supp. 1242, 1248 (D. Or. 1998), aff'd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000),
walk. Id.; Martin I1,
affd, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001).
304. Martin II1, 204 F.3d at 1000. The court accepted the district court's findings that fatigue
is primarily psychological. Id. Most golfers choose to walk even if given the chance to use a
cart, and the PGA does not levy a handicap penalty if a golfer does use a cart. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.; see also supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text (discussing Martin's condition
and the pain he must endure while living with the condition).
307. Martin 11, 204 F.3d at 1000.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1002.
310. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1889 (2001). The Seventh Circuit, in a result differing from
the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Martin, held that waiving the "no-cart" rule would act as a
fundamental alteration to the game of golf. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001,
1006-07 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated, 121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001); see also supra Part II.C.4 (discussing
the Seventh Circuit opinion in Olinger).
311. Martin IV, 121 S.Ct. at 1884.
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PGA tournaments by a qualified disabled competitor.3 12 Second, the
Court faced the issue of whether a disabled competitor may be denied
the use of a cart because the cart fundamentally alters professional
golf.3 13 The majority, in holding that the PGA violated Title III, held
that PGA tournaments are places of public accommodation and that
allowing Martin to use a golf cart does not fundamentally alter the
nature of professional golf.3 14 The dissent disagreed, stating that the
PGA's tournaments are not places of public accommodation and
allowing Martin to use a cart fundamentally alters the type of "no-cart"
315
golf game that the PGA offers.
1. Majority Opinion
In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Ninth Circuit, and resolved both issues in favor of Casey
Martin. 3 16 First, the Court held that PGA tournaments were public
accommodations under Title III of the ADA.3 17 Second, the Court held
that the PGA discriminated against Casey Martin by not allowing him
the use of a cart because a cart is a reasonable accommodation that does
3 18
not fundamentally alter the nature of professional golf.
Initially, the majority held that the PGA's golf tours and qualifying
rounds "fit comfortably" within Title III and Martin's disability "within
its protection." 3 19 Without breaking from the conclusions reached by
the lower courts, the Supreme Court relied on the fact that Title III
320
specifically lists golf courses as places of public accommodation.
The Court stated, however, that even if PGA tournaments did not fall
under Title III as a golf course, its tournaments would be considered
places of exhibition. 32 1 As an operator of a place of public
accommodation, the Court held that the PGA cannot discriminate

312. Id. At the Supreme Court level, the PGA conceded that "its tournaments are conducted
at places of public accommodation." Id. at 1890.
313. Id. at 1884.
314. Id. at 1890, 1894-98.
315. Id. at 1898-1903 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
316. Id. at 1884, 1897-98.
317. Id. at 1890.
318. Id. at 1893-98.
319. Id. at 1890.
320. Id.; see also supra note 87 and accompanying text (defining a public accommodation).
321. Martin IV, 121 S.Ct. at 1892. The Court relied on Daniel v. Paul, where the Court held
that the definition of a "place of exhibition or entertainment" covers those who participate in
"some sport or activity," as well as "spectators or listeners." Martin IV, 121 S.Ct. at 1892 (citing
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 306 (1969)).
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against individuals in the full and equal enjoyment of the PGA's
322
privileges.
After holding that Title III was applicable to PGA competitions, the
majority rejected the PGA's argument that its professional golfers are
not members of the class sought to be protected under Title III because
they are not "clients or customers" seeking to obtain the services of a
public accommodation. 323 The majority stated that the general
parameters of Title III are broad and do not contain a client or customer
limitation.3 24 Alternatively, even if Title III only applied to clients or
customers, the Court held that a golfer who pays $3000 to compete in
the Q-School is clearly a client or customer who qualifies for Title III
protection.

325

Next, the Court considered whether the PGA discriminated against
Casey Martin by denying him the use of a golf cart. 326 Because the
PGA did not challenge the lower courts' determination that a cart is a
reasonable accommodation, the Court only needed to determine whether
the use of a cart fundamentally altered the game of golf.327 To answer

this issue, the majority concluded that professional golf could be
modified in two ways. 328 Initially, a change or elimination of a rule can
alter an essential aspect of a sport to the point where it would not be
329
acceptable even if it altered the game equally for all competitors.
322. Id. at 1890. The majority stated that the PGA offers two privileges to the public, those of
watching the competition and of being able to compete in the competitions. Id. at 1892.
Members of the general public can compete in the competition through the qualifying tournament
if they have $3000 and two letters of recommendation. Id. Because Martin qualified through the
Q-School, the PGA cannot discriminate against Martin in the privilege of the opportunity to
compete and play on the tour. Id. at 1890.
323. Id. at 1890-92. In this argument, raised for the first time at the Supreme Court level, the
PGA argued that the ADA protects only clients or customers of places of exhibition or
entertainment. Id. at 1890-91 The PGA argued that it does not operate tournaments, but places
of "exhibition or entertainment." Id. at 1891. Martin, the PGA claimed, was a provider and not a
consumer of the PGA's services, similar to an actor in a theatrical production. Id. Therefore,
Title III should not apply because Martin is not a client or customer. Id.
324. Id. The Court noted that the client or customer limitation applies to "clients or customers
of the covered public accommodation that enters into a contractual, licensing or other
arrangement," and not the entire provisions of Title III.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
12182(b)(1)(A)(iv) (1994)).
325. Id. at 1891-92.
326. Id. at 1893. The court reiterated that the standard for discrimination under a Title III
claim is whether there was a failure to make a reasonable modification unless the PGA could
demonstrate that the requested modification would fundamentally alter the nature of the sport. Id.
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. Justice Stevens stated that an unacceptable modification of the game would be a
modification of "such an essential aspect of the game... that it would be unacceptable even if it
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Alternatively, a modification could cause a less significant change,
which is peripheral to the game, but might give a disabled player an
advantage over other players. 330 The majority held, however, that
allowing Martin
to use a cart does not amount to either type of
33 1
modification.
First, the majority held that waiving the "no-cart" rule does not
fundamentally alter the game because the use of a golf cart is not
inconsistent with the character of golf. 332 The court initially noted that
the Rules of Golf dictate that the essence of golf is shot-making, 333 and
not walking. 334 Moreover, the Rules of Golf do not require players to
walk, nor do they forbid the use of carts or penalize players for using a
cart. 3 3 5 Finally, the Court noted that the "no-cart" rule is not an
indispensable feature of golf tournaments because carts are allowed on a
number of professional tournaments and during a portion of the Q336
School and PGA tournaments.
Second, the majority rejected the PGA's argument that allowing the
use of a cart creates a competitive advantage, and fundamentally alters
the outcome of a tournament by removing the element of fatigue from
the game of golf. 337 The majority noted that it is impossible to
affected all competitors equally .
Id. An example would be changing the diameter of the
hole from three to six inches. Id.
330. Id. The Court did not cite an example of this type of fundamental alteration, but makes it
clear that Martin's case does not fall into this category. See id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1893-94; see also supra notes 183-96 and accompanying text (discussing the Rules
of Golf and the rules governing play during a PGA tournament).
334. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1894-95. The majority stated that "[firom early on, the essence
of the game has been shot-making-using clubs to cause a ball to progress from the teeing ground
to a hole some distance away with as few strokes as possible." Id. at 1893-94 (citing KENNETH
CHAPMAN, RULES OF THE GREEN 14-15 (1997)). The majority also pointed out that golf carts are
widely used and encouraged today because the number of golf clubs have increased since the
inception of the game, carts speed up play, and cart fees produce a large amount of revenue. Id.
at 1894.
335. Id. Although the majority conceded that a "no-cart" rule appears in the "hard card," the
majority pointed out that the "no-cart" rule is based on an optional condition in the Appendix to
the Rules of Golf. Id. at 1894-95. Therefore, the Court held the rule is not essential to the game
of golf. Id. at 1895.
336. Id. The majority pointed out that carts are allowed during the first two rounds of the QSchool, the entire Senior PGA tournament, and the Senior Amateur and the Senior Women's
Amateur tournaments sponsored by the USGA. Id. The court also noted that carts are even
allowed during certain rounds of the PGA and Buy.com Tours, although usually only in cases
where there is a large distance between holes and a cart is needed to speed-up play. Id.
337. Id. at 1895-96. The PGA argued that the goal of golf at the highest level is to compare
performance, which can only be meaningful if competitors are subjected to identical rules. Id. at
1895. Therefore a waiver of an outcome-affecting rule, such as the "no-cart" rule, would violate
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guarantee that all competitors will play under the same conditions or
that an individual's ability will be the sole determinant of a player's
success.33 8 For example, factors such as the weather and luck may
ultimately play a key role in determining a player's success. 339 The
majority also held that the fatigue from walking a four day PGA
tournament is not significant enough to affect the outcome of the
340
tournament.
In concluding that walking does not significantly affect the outcome
of a tournament, the majority reiterated the principle that the ADA
requires a court to make an individualized inquiry into whether the use
of a cart fundamentally alters the game. 34 1 The Court stated that if the
purpose of the "no-cart" rule is truly to inject fatigue into the game, then
an individualized inquiry shows that Martin endures greater fatigue with
a cart than others do by walking. 34 2 Therefore, allowing Martin to use a
cart does not compromise the purpose of the "no-cart" rule. 34 3 Rather,
the cart is a modification that provides an exception to a rule without
impairing the purpose of the rule. 3 " Therefore, because the PGA is an
operator of a place of public accommodation, and allowing Martin to
use a golf cart does not fundamentally alter the game of professional
the PGA must permit Martin to use a cart
golf, the majority held that 345
tournaments.
PGA
all
during

this equality and fundamentally alter the nature of the "highest level athletic event." Id. In
rejecting the PGA's argument, the court pointed out that Title III did not provide an exemption
for elite athletics, and thus the PGA did not have carte-blanche to determine which of its rules are
essential. Id. at 1896, 1897 & n.51.
338. Id. at 1895.
339. Id. The Court stated that weather may have a significant impact on the success of the
players. Id. As an example, the court stated that changes in weather could potentially create a
harder playing green and increased wind, which could affect competitors differently. Id. A lucky
bounce could also play a significant role, such that pure chance may have a greater impact on a
player's success than fatigue. Id.
340. Id. at 1896. The majority relied on evidence showing that when players are given the
chance to use a cart, most players still prefer to walk, as walking helps relieve the players' stress,
allows them to keep the rhythm of their game, and gives the players a sense of the elements. Id.
The majority also accepted the expert testimony heard in the district court, which concluded that
fatigue from the game is primarily psychological. Id.
341. Id. at 1896-97. The court stated that an individualized inquiry must be used to determine
"whether a specific modification for a particular person's disability would be reasonable under
the circumstances as well as necessary for that person, and yet at the same time not work a
fundamental alteration." Id. at 1896 (citing S. REP. No. 101-116, at 61 (1989); H.R. REP. No.
10 1-485, pt. 2, at 102 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 385)).
342. Id. at 1897.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 1890-97.
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2. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent, authored by Justice Scalia, disagreed with the majority
opinion that PGA tournaments are places of public accommodation
covered under Title III and that allowing Casey Martin to use a golf cart
will not fundamentally alter the nature of professional golf. 34 6 First,
Justice Scalia determined that PGA tournaments are not places of public
accommodation, and as a result, Title III does not protect Casey
Martin. 347 Second, Justice Scalia stated that a golf cart is not a
reasonable accommodation because it forces the PGA to offer a
different game of golf than that which it typically offers. 348 Finally, he
declared that the Court was not in a position to decide whether any
349
athletic rule has a fundamental impact upon a competition.
To begin, Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's holding that
Title III applies to sports organizations such as the PGA. 350 First, he
criticized the majority for reading the statutory definition of a public
accommodation too broadly and in a way that would apply to
individuals who were clearly not covered under Title 111.351 Second,
Justice Scalia opined that Title III does not apply to Casey Martin
because Title III is only meant to protect customers, of which Casey
Martin is not. 352 Justice Scalia stated that the traditional understanding
of public accommodation laws, such as Title III, is that they provide

346. Id. at 1898, 1902 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia in the
dissent.
347. Id. at 1898 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see infra notes 350-60 and accompanying text
(outlining the dissent's view that the PGA does not operate places of public accommodation).
348. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1901-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see infra notes 361-65 and
accompanying text (discussing the dissents opinion that a golf cart is not a reasonable
accommodation for Casey Martin).
349. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1902-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see infra notes 366-74 and
accompanying text (exploring the dissent's determination that allowing Martin to use a cart
fundamentally alters professional golf).
350. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1898 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
351. Id. at 1898-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that the majority's reading
"muddles" the ADA and creates an unreasonable interpretation of Title I. Id. at 1899 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). With this reading, Scalia opined that Title III would cover employees and
independent contractors even though Title I excludes employers of less than fifteen employees
and independent contractors from its provisions. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). He further argued
that Congress has no reason to give employees and independent contractors protections that other
employees are unable to receive because they do not work at a place of public accommodation.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
352. Id. at 1900 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Scalia stated that Title III did not
apply to Martin because Title III only applies to privileges and not competitions or tryouts. Id. at
1900-01 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Scalia stated that the Q-School for which Martin sought a waiver
of the "no-cart" rule was not a privilege, but rather a competition for entry, and thus not protected
by Title Ill. Id. at 1900 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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rights for customers only and not providers. 353 The dissent determined
that the definition of a public accommodation envisions that customers
will enjoy these goods and services. 354 Because Martin and the PGA
provide entertainment to customers, the dissent concluded that Martin is
a provider of entertainment rather than a customer. 355 Thus, because
356
Martin is a provider, Title III cannot apply to Martin's case.
Subsequently, Justice Scalia argued that even if Title III is applicable,
the PGA Tour is not a public accommodation. 357 Although he conceded
that Title III names a golf course as a place of public accommodation, a
golf course could also be a place of exercise or recreation. 358 According
to Justice Scalia, because a competitor's purpose is to make money and
not exercise or recreate, a PGA tournament cannot be a place of public
accommodation.3 59 Thus, Title III cannot be applied to protect Casey
36
Martin. 0
After considering whether Title III applied, Justice Scalia focused on
how the majority failed to address whether a golf cart was a reasonable
accommodation. 36 1 Justice Scalia pointed out that Title III does not
regulate the content of a good, privilege, or service, but only requires
that the disabled have access to the same goods, services, and privileges
that the non-disabled enjoy. 362 Thus, Title III does not regulate the

353. Id. at 1898 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that when a law addresses
discrimination by places of public accommodation through "contractual" arrangements, Title III
only applies to clients or customers and not other parties. Id. at 1899 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In
addition, Department of Justice regulations state that the purpose of a public accommodation
requirement "is to ensure accessibility to the goods offered by a public accommodation." Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36 (2000)).
354. Id. at 1898-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia used an auditorium or place of
public gathering as an example. Id. at 1899 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Gathering, he stated, is the
enjoyment derived from the auditorium. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, Title III covers those
gathering but not those who clean the auditorium because they are working and not gathering. Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
355. Id. at 1900 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that the PGA is a professional
event that provides entertainment. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Professional golfers do not enjoy
the entertainment of the tour, but rather participate in the entertainment. Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Thus, Martin cannot be a customer. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
356. Id. at 1899 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
357. Id. at 1900 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
358. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
359. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that because competitors on PGA tours are
not buying recreation or entertainment, but are selling it, the PGA cannot be a public
accommodation as a "golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation." Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (1994)).
360. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
361. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
362. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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content that a public accommodation must offer. 363 Specifically, the
Code of Federal Regulations states that a public accommodation is not
required to alter its inventory in order to include special goods which
can be used by the disabled.3 64 Justice Scalia concluded that allowing
Martin to use a cart conflicts with the PGA's ability to provide a game
of "walking-only" golf, and thus is an impermissible attempt to regulate
content.3 65
In addition, Justice Scalia concluded that a waiver of the "no-cart"
rule acts as a fundamental alteration to the game of golf because
walking is an essential element of the game. 366 He stated that because
sports exist to provide entertainment, many rules of sport are
arbitrary. 367 Thus, Justice Scalia argued that a court of law is ill suited
368
to determine which rules are essential to a particular game.
Furthermore, he stated that the PGA should be free to create its own
369
game of golf if it wishes.
Finally, Justice Scalia noted that even if the PGA bears a legal
obligation to offer its competitors the opportunity to play the traditional
game of golf, walking is still essential to that game. 370 He disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that chance can play as significant a role
in a player's success as allowing Martin to use a cart, because chance is

363. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
364. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia discussed a camera shop as an example of this
argument. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 560
(7th Cir. 1999)). He stated that because Title III does not regulate content, an owner of the shop
is not required to provide a special camera for a visually disabled person if he would not provide
this item as a normal part of his business. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
365. Id. at 1902 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
366. Id. at 1902-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia recognized that although the PGA
cannot deny Martin access to the game, "it need not provide him a different game." Id. at 1902
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
367. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia notes that all sports are entirely arbitrary and
there is "no basis on which anyone-not even the Supreme Court of the United States-can
pronounce one or another of them to be 'nonessential' if the rulemaker ... deems it to be
essential." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
368. Id. at 1903 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that because rules of sport are
arbitrary and oftentimes based on tradition, a court cannot consider a rule to be insignificant if the
rulemaking body deems the rule to be essential. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). As examples, the
dissent stated that playing eighteen holes during a round of golf, and requiring a ten foot high
basketball hoop are arbitrary rules that are impossible for the court to determine if they are
essential to their sport. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
369. Id. at 1902 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that the PGA is not required to
create a game of classic golf, and should be free to create its own rules, as the American League
did in baseball when it created the designated hitter. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
370. Id. at 1902-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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randomly distributed. 371 Allowing Martin to use a cart, Justice Scalia
372
concluded, gives Martin a consistent advantage over other golfers.
Ultimately, Justice Scalia rationalized that the ADA only requires the
PGA to give Martin equal access to its Q-School and tournaments, but
not an equal chance to win. 37 3 Justice Scalia therefore concluded that
PGA tournaments were not places of public accommodation and that
the PGA should not be required to offer its competitors a different game
3 74
of golf by allowing Casey Martin to use a golf cart.
IV. ANALYSIS
In PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, the United States Supreme Court
correctly concluded that the PGA's Q-School and tournaments are
places of public accommodation under Title III, and that waiving the
"no-cart" rule for Martin is a reasonable accommodation that would not
fundamentally alter the nature of professional golf. 375 First, this Section
demonstrates that the Court correctly read the provisions of Title III
when it held that PGA tournaments fall within the definition of a public
accommodation. 376 Second, this Section discusses how the majority
correctly utilized an individualized determination when it held that
377
allowing Casey Martin to use a cart is a reasonable accommodation.
This Section then determines that the majority correctly concluded that
a waiver of the "no-cart" rule is not an outcome-affecting rule that
fundamentally alters the nature of the game. 378 Finally, this Section
discusses the dissent's mistaken argument that allowing Martin to use a

371. Id. at 1903 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
372. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent determined that chance matters at the margin, but
a cart substantially improves Martin's competitive prospects beyond a few strokes. Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
373. Id. at 1904 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that giving an exemption to a rule
that emphasizes a player's weakness destroys the nature of a competitive sport, which relies on
the application of uniform rules. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
374. Id. at 1898, 1901-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
375. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the majority's holding that Title III applies to PGA
tournaments and allowing Martin to use a cart does not fundamentally alter the game).
376. See infra Part IV.A (demonstrating the majority's correct interpretation that PGA golf
courses and tournaments are places of public accommodation under Title Il).
377. See infra Part IV.B (stating that the majority correctly utilized an individualized inquiry
in holding that a golf cart is reasonable in light of Martin's disability).
378. See infra Part IV.C (determining that the majority correctly held the fatigue element in
the "no-cart" rule is insignificant and cannot fundamentally alter professional golf).
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golf cart provides Martin with a competitive advantage over other
players.

37 9

A. Public Accommodation
The Supreme Court correctly employed a broad interpretation of Title
380
III when it determined that the PGA was a public accommodation.
First, the Court correctly emphasized that the ultimate purpose behind
the ADA was to eliminate discrimination against the disabled.3 81
Consistent with this broad goal, Congress did not exempt professional
sports organizations from the provisions of Title 111.382 If Congress
wanted to exempt professional sports organizations from Title III, it
could have created the same exemptions given to religious organizations
and private clubs. 383 Because Congress did not provide this exemption,
professional sports organizations must abide by Title 111.384
In addition, the Court correctly held that the PGA is a public
accommodation because it operates golf courses for its Q-School and
professional tournaments. 385 Title III specifically lists golf courses as

379. See infra Part IV.D (discussing why the dissent incorrectly concluded that a golf cart
provides Martin with a competitive advantage); see also Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1902-04 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
380. See supra notes 317-25 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's holding that
PGA tournaments are public accommodations). The majority stated that the PGA's "golf tours
and their qualifying rounds fit comfortably within the coverage of Title IIl ....
Martin IV, 121
S. Ct. at 1890.
381. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1889. The Court reiterated that there was a compelling need "to
eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals, and to integrate them 'into the economic
and social mainstream of American life."' Id.; see also supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text
(noting the congressional purposes behind the ADA).
382. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1890-91 (stating that the PGA's golf tournaments are places of
public accommodation under Title III). Congress only provided a Title I exemption for private
clubs and religious organizations, and makes no mention of professional sports. 42 U.S.C. §
12187 (1994); see also supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (discussing the ADA's
exemption for private clubs and religious organizations).
383. See 42 U.S.C. § 12187. As the district court in Martin held, professional sports
organizations such as the PGA are not private clubs because the purpose of the organizations are
to generate revenue, and non-members such as the media are allowed access to sporting events.
Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1324-26 (D. Or. 1998), ), aff'd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'd,
121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001); see also supra notes 265-69 and accompanying text (detailing the district
court's holding that the PGA is not a private club exempt from Title EIl).
384. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1890-91; see also Martin 1, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (D. Or.
1998) (stating that the ADA "does not distinguish between sports organizations and other entities
when it comes to applying the ADA to a specific situation"), aff'd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000),
affid, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001).
385. See supra notes 319-22 and accompanying text (noting that because the PGA operates
golf courses, it cannot discriminate against the disabled in the equal enjoyment of the privileges
that the PGA offers).
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places of public accommodation under Title III, and as an operator of
these courses, discriminatory conduct on the part of the PGA is
prohibited. 386 Without exception, all playing surfaces fall within Title
387
III's scope if they are specifically listed as a public accommodation.
To hold otherwise would not only require courts to determine when to
hold a public accommodation exempt, but would also leave courts with
too much discretion in determining when a public accommodation
should be subject to Title 111.388 For example, should a private
tournament at a golf club or private university be exempt from Title III
because it has leased a public golf course for competitive purposes and
not recreation? 389 Clearly, when Congress enacted a statute as broad as
the ADA, it did not intend to place this type of restriction on the list of
public accommodations. 390 Thus, the majority correctly determined that
39 1
the PGA, as a public accommodation, must comply with Title III.
B. Reasonable Accommodation and Individualized Determination
Second, the Martin majority correctly recognized the importance of
an individualized determination in applying the provisions of Title III,
as using a generalized inquiry is inconsistent with the broad provisions
of the ADA. 392 Under a generalized inquiry, allowing an able-bodied
player to use a golf cart would not be a reasonable accommodation
386. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). A public accommodation is specifically defined to include a "golf
course, or other place of exercise or recreation." Id. An operator of a place of public
accommodation cannot discriminate against a disabled individual in the enjoyment of "goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
387. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). A public accommodation is defined broadly to include a
variety of public entities. Id. Furthermore, Title III does not provide an exemption for public
accommodations under certain situations, such as when the public is restricted from utilizing the
public accommodation. See id.
388. See 42 U.S.C. § 12187. As written, Congress only provided a Title III exemption for
private clubs and religious organizations. Id.
389. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing how courts have determined
whether an entity qualifies for a private club exemption); see also supra note 266 and
accompanying text (defining the seven factor test used by courts in determining the applicability
of the private club exemption).
390. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose behind the ADA).
Specifically, the ADA was enacted in order to "provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. §
12 101(b); see also Michael Waterstone, Let's Be Reasonable Here: Why the ADA Will Not Ruin
Professional Sports, 2000 BYU L. REv. 1489, 1548-49 (2000). Waterstone warns that exempting
professional sports from the ADA would send the wrong message that the disabled are secondclass citizens who cannot be competitive at the highest levels of professional sports. Waterstone,
supra.
391. See Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1896-97 (2001).
392. See id. at 1896.
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since there is likely no reason why the able-bodied golfer cannot walk
the course. 393 Under an individualized inquiry, however, Casey Martin
is clearly unable to walk a round of golf.394 First, Martin's disability is
not only painful, but has also resulted in severe atrophy of his right leg,
creating a high risk of amputation should Martin fall while on the
course. 395 Second, Martin must still walk one-quarter of the course
even when he uses a cart, 396and he is more fatigued with the use of a
cart than his able-bodied competitors who walk the entire course. 397 As
a result of this fatigue, Casey Martin will not be able to gain a
competitive advantage over his able-bodied competitors, but will only
be allowed a chance to compete. 398 In light of these facts, modifying
the "no-cart" rule is a reasonable accommodation for Martin's
disability.3 99
C. FundamentalAlteration
Next, the Court correctly determined that allowing Casey Martin to
use a golf cart during PGA tournaments does not fundamentally alter
the nature of these professional tournaments. 4°° In holding that the "nocart" rule is not outcome affecting, the majority correctly pointed out
the inconsistency between the PGA's statements that walking is a
fundamental part of the game, and the PGA's own actions in allowing
competitors to use golf carts in a variety of other situations. 410 ' For
example, the PGA's Q-School began in 1965, and qualifiers were
allowed to use a cart during all three rounds of the Q-School up until
1997. 402 Current Q-School competitors, however, are only allowed to
use a cart during the first two rounds. 40 3 If the PGA allows carts in the
393. See id. The majority stated that the "waiver of an essential rule of competition for
anyone would fundamentally alter the nature of petitioner's tournaments." Id.
394. See id. The majority points out that the PGA did not even contest that a golf cart is a
reasonable accommodation for Casey Martin. Id. at 1893.
395. Id. at 1885-86.
396. Martin 11, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1251 (D. Or. 1998), aff'd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000),
aff'd, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001); see also supra note 285 and accompanying text (discussing why
Martin must still walk one-quarter of the golf course even with a cart).
397. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1897; Martin 1!, 994 F. Supp. at 1252.
398. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1897.
399. See id. at 1896.
400. Id. at 1897; see also supra notes 337-45 and accompanying text (discussing the
majority's holding that a golf cart does not fundamentally alter the game of golf).
401. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1895; see also supra note 336 and accompanying text (outlining
the Court's discussion in pointing out the PGA's inconsistent arguments that walking is essential
to the game of golf).
402. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1884, 1895.
403. Id. at 1895.
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first two rounds in order to speed up the competition, the PGA is
affirming the argument that walking is not an important part of the
game and that allowing the use of a cart does not create a competitive
40
advantage. 4
In addition to the Q-School, competitors are allowed to use a cart
during the open qualifying events, which are conducted prior to the
beginning of each tournament, and during all rounds of the Senior PGA
Tour.4°5 Likewise, players on the PGA and Buy.com Tours are also
allowed to use a cart for the convenience of the PGA, such as when a
player's ball is lost. 4° 6 Surely if walking was fundamental and outcome
affecting, the PGA would not allow its players to use a cart under any
circumstances.
Second, the majority correctly concluded that allowing Martin to use
a cart would not fundamentally alter the game of golf because the
essential element of the game, shot-making, is not affected by allowing
a disabled player to use a cart. 407 In addition, the element of walking is
not unique to the sport.4°8 Unlike driving and putting, walking is not
something professional golfers train to do. 409 Golfers likely do not
incorporate a high degree of physical fitness and physical training into
their activities like a tennis player or sprinter. 4 10 Thus, the essential
element of golf, shot-making, is not affected if a player decides to walk
the course or use a motorized cart. 4 11 Because shot-making and not

404. See id.
405. Id.
406. Brief for Respondent at 7, Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001) (No. 00-24), available at
2000 WL 1706762. When a player's ball is lost, the PGA allows the player to take a cart back to
the tee. Id. In addition, the PGA allows all competitors to ride from one hole to another when the
distance between holes is too great. Id.
407. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1893-97.
408. Waterstone, supra note 390, at 1543. Waterstone notes that instead of walking being a
skill that is unique to golf, it is a skill that most individuals are able to perform. Id.
409. Id. Golfers likely do not practice walking in the way that a basketball player practices
making baskets or the way that a baseball player practices hitting the baseball. Id.
410. Id. Although a number of professional golfers are beginning to incorporate physical
fitness into their training regimens, it is unlikely that any of these individuals are practicing the
act of walking. Id.
411. See Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1893-94. The Amicus Curiae brief of the KlippelTrenaunay-Weber Support Group stated:
Golf... is not a contest in which speed, mobility, size, or quickness is essential (in
contrast to sports like tennis, soccer, basketball, football, and running). The lowest
score wins in PGA events. There is no bonus reduction in strokes for fast play; no
style points for speed or walking form; no requirement run between shots; and no
penalty for moving up the fairway too slowly (although time limits apply once a ball is
reached and before it is struck). The game is about skilled shot-making, not walking.
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walking is the essential element of the game, a player gains no
competitive advantage by using a cart. 412 A player using a cart must
endure the same weather elements when playing the ball on the course
regardless of whether or not he arrives at the ball in a cart. 4 13 Although
a single stroke can make all the difference, it is equally likely that a one
stroke difference could be the result of changes in the weather, crowd
reaction, the type of club used, and of course, luck.4 14
Finally, the majority correctly concluded that the fatigue created in
4 15
walking a round of golf is insignificant to the outcome of the game.
If walking is essential in order to inject fatigue into the game, then the
PGA ought to forbid the use of caddies, and instead, require the players
to carry their own clubs. Unlike basketball or football, where players
use a large amount of energy throughout a game, golfers expend
relatively few calories by walking a round of golf. 4 16 These calories are
expended over a long period, as golfers walk slowly over the entire
course. 4 17 Thus, the amount of stamina required to walk a five mile
course is small and does not play a role in a golfer's performance in the
same way, for example, that stamina plays a role in the performance of
a basketball player during the fourth period.418 Therefore, the majority

Brief of Amicus Curiae K-T Support Group at 24, Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001) (No. 00-24),
availableat 2000 WL 1846088.
412. See Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1893-94. The Rules of Golf define golf as "playing a ball
from the teeing ground into the hole by a stroke or successive strokes in accordance with the
Rules." UNITED STATES GOLF ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 23 (emphasis in original).
413. See Brian Pollock, Note, The Supreme Court Appeal of the Casey Martin Case: The
Court's Two Opinions- Martin's Hole-in-One or Olinger's Slice into the Bunker, 10 DEPAULLCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 391, 438 (2000). Pollock notes that "[a]ll golfers must endure
the same elements; thus, the fact that a golfer uses a cart does not make him less susceptible to
heat and humidity." Id. at 437-38.
414. See Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1895.
415. Id. at 1896; see also supra notes 337-40 and accompanying text (outlining the majority's
holding that fatigue is insignificant to the game of golf). Ken Venturi, the 1964 U.S. Open
winner, has testified that mental fatigue, and not physical fatigue, is the primary source of fatigue
in a PGA competition. Brief for Respondent at 38, Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001) (No. 0024), availableat 2000 WL 1706762.
416. Martin II, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1250 (D. Or. 1998), aff'd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000),
aff'd, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001). Expert testimony during Martin's trial indicated that approximately
500 calories are expended during a round of golf. Id.
417. Id. Expert testimony concluded that the calories expended during a round of golf are
expended over a five-hour period, and players frequently have a chance to drink refreshments and
rest. Id.
418. See Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1896 (citing the low intensity of the golf game, the small
amount of energy used, and the many opportunities for rest and refreshment as reasons for
concluding that the fatigue created from walking a golf course is not significant enough to affect
the outcome of a tournament).
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was correct in holding that the use of
a golf cart does not fundamentally
4 19
alter the nature of professional golf.
D. Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Scalia incorrectly argued that allowing Casey
Martin to use a golf cart was not a reasonable accommodation. 420 First,
the dissent incorrectly stated that the majority impermissibly regulated
content in holding that a golf cart was a reasonable accommodation for
Martin. 42 1 In stating that the PGA is not required to provide a game of
golf different than what it normally offers, the dissent erroneously
analogizes to a case in which a camera store owner would not be
required to stock a special camera for a visually impaired individual.42 2
Unlike Scalia's analogy, Martin does not want the PGA to offer a
different game of golf, but is simply requesting that he be allowed equal
access to the course by using a cart as transportation from hole to
hole.423 Furthermore, the PGA does not suffer economically by
allowing Martin to use a cart in the same way that a storeowner would
suffer by stocking a special camera for the visually impaired.424
In addition, the dissent incorrectly concluded that allowing Martin to
use a cart creates a competitive advantage in his favor. 425 In fact,
Martin is more disadvantaged than his able-bodied competitors even
with the use of a cart. 4 2 6 Martin is still required to walk about one-

419. See id. at 1898; see also supra notes 337-45 and accompanying text (discussing the
majority's holding that allowing Martin to use a golf cart does not fundamentally alter the game
of golf).
420. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1901-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
421. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 361-65 and accompanying text (outlining
the argument by the dissent that Casey Martin was impermissibly regulating content by seeking to
use a cart during PGA tournaments).
422. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1901 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Under the Code of Federal
Regulations, the store owner would not have to stock special cameras for the visually impaired if
these items are not stocked as a part of the store's everyday business. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
423. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994). Title III ensures that the disabled receive equal access
to the "full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations" offered by an owner or operator of a place of public accommodation. Id.
424. See Pollock, supra note 413, at 436. The author states that the cost of a golf cart is a
minimal imposition on the financial resources of a professional sports organization. Id. The
author also notes that the PGA is a multi-million dollar empire, evident by the award money it
grants and its lucrative network television contract. Id. at 435.
425. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1903 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra note 372 and
accompanying text (discussing Scalia's argument that Casey Martin will have a competitive
advantage by using a golf cart).
426. See Martin II, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1251 (D. Or. 1998), aff'd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir.
2000), aff'd, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001). The district court stated that the fatigue Martin endures
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quarter of the course merely because the cart cannot be driven on certain
parts of the course. 42 7 Furthermore, just getting in and out of the cart
for Martin can be more physically exhausting than the entire five-mile
walk for other golfers. 428 Because Casey Martin is not given an
advantage by using a cart, but is only put on an equal footing with those
who can walk the entire course, the dissent's conclusion that Martin
gains a competitive advantage through the use of a cart is unfounded.4 29
V.

IMPACT

In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in PGA Tour, Inc. v.
430
Martin, Americans have yet to see its impact on professional sports.
Because the Supreme Court found Title III applicable to PGA
tournaments, other professional sports could be required to make
reasonable accommodations in order to accommodate a disabled
athlete.43 1 However, because the Court decided Martin on narrow
grounds, its decision will not lead to an all out modification of the rules,
432
which will forever change the nature of professional sports.
Nevertheless, the Court's decision will ultimately create an increased
administrative and financial burden for professional sports organizations
and the court system when determining whether a requested
modification is reasonable and whether it fundamentally alters the
nature of the particular game.4 33

from dealing with his disability is greater than the fatigue injected on the "able-bodied by the
requirement that they walk from shot to shot." Id.
427. Id.; see also supra note 285 and accompanying text (discussing why Martin must still
walk one-quarter of the golf cart even with the use of a cart).
428. Martin 111, 204 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'd, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001). The Ninth
Circuit noted that Martin must endure significant pain and stress while getting in and out of the
cart. Id.; see also supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text (discussing Martin's condition and
the pain he must endure while living with the condition).
429. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1903 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 370-74 and
accompanying text (discussing Scalia's argument that Casey Martin will gain a competitive
advantage by using a golf cart).
430. Adam Jay Golden, A Good Walk Spoiled: The Americans with DisabilitiesAct and the
Casey Martin Case, 7 SPORTS LAW. J. 161, 178 (2000). Golden notes that it "may take years
before the full effects of Martin are felt in professional sports." Id.
431. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. at 1890-9 1; see infra Part V.A (discussing the positive implications
that Martin will have on other professional sports organizations); see also Davis, supra note 11,
at 44. Davis states that "[tihe ADA has finally made a foray into the world of professional sports.
This event is significant, for it may encourage others to wield the ADA as a means of seeking
redress in this field .. " Id.
432. See infra Part V.B (stating that Martin will not lead to an all out modification of the rules
of professional sports).
433. See infra Part V.C (noting that Martin will result in increased administrative and
financial burdens for professional sports organizations and the courts).
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A. ProfessionalSports OrganizationsAre Not Exempt From the Law
The Court's decision in Martin limited the autonomy of professional
sports to set its own rules and regulations governing play. 434 Consistent
with the ADA, which does not exempt professional sports leagues from
its provisions, these organizations must adhere to the requirements of
the law and are prohibited from discriminating against the disabled.4 35
Sports organizations can no longer refuse to make reasonable
accommodations for disabled athletes, as professional sports are not
exempt from accommodating the disabled any more than employers are
prohibited6 from discriminating against the disabled in job related
43
matters.
B. Martin Will Not Alter Essential Rules of Sports
Many critics of the Court's decision in Martin incorrectly argue that
the decision will lead to an all out modification of the rules of
professional sports at the hands of the court system.4 37 Critics claim
that the PGA will soon be required to expand the diameter of a golf hole
to accommodate a legally blind golfer, or that a disabled basketball
player must be allowed to use spring-loaded shoes. 438 However,
arguing that that the Martin decision will create an all out modification
of the professional rules of sports is simply unfounded. First, only a
few sports easily lend themselves to accommodating the disabled.4 3 9
434. William E. Spruill, Note, Giving New Meaning to "'Handicap:"The Americans with
Disabilities Act and its Uneasy Relationship with Professional Sports in PGA Tour, Inc. v.
Martin, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 365, 389 (2001) (noting that the role of professional sports
organizations in creating and regulating their rules will now be questioned).
435. See Waterstone, supra note 390, at 1524. Waterstone applauds the Court for rejecting
the argument that professional sports are exempt from the ADA and notes that those that say
professional sports should be exempted from the ADA are putting professional sports on a
pedestal. Id. at 1524, 1547. He further states that "[t]he ADA must be applied equally to
professional sports because Congress ...did not say that it should not." Id. at 1546.
436. See id. at 1547-48. Waterstone captures the absurdity in those who argue that
professional sports should be exempt from the ADA by questioning whether competitions in
sports are more important than getting a legal job in a prestigious law firm. Id. at 1548.
437. See Meadows, supra note 24, at C4 (citing extreme examples of the potential impact of
Martin on professional sports). Meadows cites examples such as whether a disabled runner will
be given a head start in a track competition, and whether a visually challenged baseball player
will be allowed four strikes, as opposed to three strikes, before they are called out. Id.
438. See Joe Cappo, Next, NBA Lowers Goals for Vertically Impaired, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus.,
Mar. 9, 1998, at 8, available at 1998 WL 7284598. Cappo questions whether the PGA should
now be forced to accommodate the blind, elderly, and obese golfers who desire to play on the
PGA Tour, or whether the NBA should be forced to lower the height of the basketball rim to
eliminate any advantage which taller players enjoy. id.
439. See infra notes 441-44 and accompanying text (noting that golf is only one of a few
sports where modifications can be made which will not change the nature of the game).
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Second, because the ADA limits the modifications that must be made to
accommodate an individual by requiring that the modifications be
reasonable, sports fans will not see a complete reversal of the rules of
440
professional sports.
First, golf is one of only a few sports that easily lends itself to
modification under the ADA without changing the nature of the
game. 44 1 For example, using a strobe light during swimming or track
and field meets will successfully allow hearing-impaired athletes to
compete, but will not have an effect on the hearing athletes' ability to be
the fastest in their respective heat. 44 2 However, not all sports can
reasonably accommodate a disabled athlete without fundamentally
altering the game. Casey Martin, for example, would not be able to
request a modification of the rules of baseball, which require a player to
run the bases. 44 3 Waiving this type of rule in baseball is an extreme
modification that would result in a fundamental alteration to the
44
game.
Second, the text of the ADA places limitations on the modifications
used to accommodate a disabled individual. One such limitation is that
the ADA requires an individual be "disabled" within the meaning of the
ADA. 4 5 Thus, the inability to jump is not a disability that would force
the National Basketball Association to lower the height of the basketball
rim from ten to eight feet. 446 A second limitation is that the requested

440. See infra notes 445-54 and accompanying text (noting that the specific requirements of a
Title IIIclaim will prevent an all out modification of the rules of sports).
441. Alex B. Long, A Good Walk Spoiled: Casey Martin and the ADA's Reasonable
Accommodation Requirement in Competitive Settings, 77 OR. L. REV. 1337, 1377 (1998). The
author states that "[i]n reality, it may turn out that professional golf is one of the few sports where
an accommodation of one of the major rules of play might not fundamentally alter the nature of
the game." Id. Unlike golf, where walking is secondary to the sport, Long notes that "[t]he same
cannot be said of most other sports." Id. at 1377-78.
442. Id. at 1377. The author notes that modifying starting procedures during a swimming
meet will not have any effect on able-bodied competitors and can provide an easy remedy for a
disabled competitor. Id.
443. The Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome Support Group notes that because KlippelTrenaunay-Weber Syndrome afflicts one or more limbs, an athlete afflicted with this disease
would not be able to request a head start in a swimming competition, as this would fundamentally
alter competitive swimming. See Brief of Amicus Curiae K-T Support Group at 28, Martin IV,
121 S.Ct. 1879 (2001) (No. 00-24), availableat 2000 WL 1846088.
444. See Martin IV, 121 S.Ct. at 1893. The majority notes that a modification can alter "such
an essential aspect of the game of golf that it would be unacceptable even if it affected all
competitors equally." Id.
445. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (defining a prima facie claim under Title
HI).
446. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1) (2001). The Department of Justice guidelines define a
physical or mental impairment as "[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic
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accommodation must be reasonable. 447 Although allowing a disabled
athlete to use a cart is a reasonable accommodation in golf,
accommodations in other sports cannot be made so easily, while still
complying with Title III. For example, lowering the height of the rim in
basketball is clearly not reasonable because the accommodation
interferes with the essence of the game, to make the shot." 8
Finally, the ADA does not require a sports organization to make even
a reasonable accommodation if doing so fundamentally alters the nature
of the sport. 449 In other words, the ADA does not require a sports
organization to completely change the rules just so that a disabled
player may compete. 450 Many rules cannot be changed because they
would fundamentally alter the nature of the game. 45 1 For example,
lowering the height of a basketball rim, reducing the number of holes
that must be played in a round of golf, and reducing the length of a
marathon to accommodate a disabled individual would clearly be a
fundamental alteration of those respective sports. 452 If a rule can be
reasonably changed without fundamentally altering the game, however,

disfigurement, or anatomical loss ....[and] any mental or psychological disorder such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities ...." Id.
447. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (defining a prima facie claim under Title
III).
448. Waterstone, supra note 390, at 1528-29. The author states that there are elements to
professional sports that cannot and should not be modified because they create a compelling
change in the nature of the game. Id. at 1528.
449. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994). Title HI defines discrimination, in part, as
a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when
such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can
demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of
such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.
Id.
450. See id.
451. Waterstone, supra note 390, at 1528-29. In analogizing to the employment context, the
author notes that there are certain elements to professional sports that cannot be changed without
fundamentally altering the sport no matter how compelling a disabled individual's case may be.
Id.
452. See Martin 111,
204 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'd, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001). The
Ninth Circuit determined that "we have little doubt" that a request of a disabled runner to be
given a head start or a request that a "growth impaired" basketball player be allowed to shoot a
three-point shot from inside the three-point line "would result in rulings that those
accommodations fundamentally altered the competitions." Id. Other examples of modifications
that fundamentally alter the nature of a sport include requests by disabled sprinters to begin a race
inside the starting point, and requests by disabled basketball players to lower the height of a
basketball rim. Waterstone, supra note 390, at 1528.
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the ADA requires that it be done. 453 Determining whether such a
requested modification can be made without fundamentally altering the
increased burden for both the
nature of the sport will likely result in an
454
system.
court
the
and
sports organization
C. Martin Will Result in IncreasedAdministrative Burden
The impact of the Martin decision will be felt in the increased
administrative and financial burdens facing professional sports
organizations and the court system. Assuming that a qualified disabled
athlete possesses the skills necessary to compete in professional sports,
both amateur and professional sports organizations will now be required
to determine on a case-by-case basis whether an athlete's requested
accommodation is reasonable in light of that athlete's specific
disability. 455 Although, this individualized inquiry standard is
consistent with the provisions in Title III, sports organizations will see
increased 6financial and administrative costs in conducting these
45
inquiries.
Furthermore, the Martin decision leaves sports organizations and
governing bodies with little guidance in determining whether a
requested modification is reasonable, as the Court simply failed 4to57
create a standard for determining when a modification must be made.

453. See supra note 449 and accompanying text (describing when a reasonable modification
must be made by a place of public accommodation).
454. See infra Part V.C (noting that Martin will result in increased administrative and
financial burdens for professional sports organizations and the courts).
455. Martin IV, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1896 (2001). The majority stated that an individualized
inquiry must be made to determine whether a requested accommodation is reasonable and
necessary for the disabled individual and whether the accommodation would fundamentally alter
the good being provided. Id.
456. Id. at 1897-98. The majority stated that the "ADA admittedly imposes some
administrative burdens on the operators of places of public accommodation that could be avoided
by strictly adhering to general rules and policies that are entirely fair with respect to the ablebodied but that may indiscriminately preclude access by qualified persons with disabilities." Id.
at 1897; see also Spruill, supra note 434, at 389. One author notes that professional sports
organizations should expect to see increased financial burdens as a result of the Martin case.
Spruill, supra note 434, at 389. Although the author notes that the magnitude of the financial
burden is unknown, he speculates that this burden should not be large, as there are relatively few
disabled athletes in professional sports. Id.
457. Waterstone, supra note 390, at 1527. Waterstone notes that the Martin court was
ambiguous in creating a standard for determining when a modification can be made without
fundamentally altering a sport. Id. He states that "it is not clear whether the court would have
forced the defendant to present individualized proof if the court had found that walking a course
had more of an impact on competition." Id.
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As such, this ambiguity will likely create confusion. 45 8 For example, in
determining whether a request is a reasonable accommodation, how
much deference should be given to the traditional rules of the sport,
such as the fact that the basketball rim has traditionally been ten feet
high? 459 Because the Supreme Court provided little guidance to these
questions in Martin, the lower courts will be left to determine standards
of reasonable accommodation and fundamental alteration on their own.
VI. CONCLUSION

In Martin, the United States Supreme Court correctly held that PGA
tournaments are places of public accommodation under Title III.
Utilizing an individualized inquiry, the majority also correctly
recognized that allowing Casey Martin to use a golf cart is a reasonable
accommodation in light of his disability, and that doing so does not
fundamentally alter the nature of professional golf. The broad language
of Title III and Congress' intent to eliminate discrimination against the
disabled support the Court's decision. Although Martin questions the
autonomy of a sports organization to promulgate its own rules of play,
the specific requirements of Title III will prevent abuse of the ADA by
disabled athletes seeking to gain a competitive advantage. Finally,
although Martin will not open the floodgates, mandating an
individualized determination under Title III will create an increased
administrative and financial burden for professional sports organizations
and the court system.

458. Id. at 1526. As examples of the ambiguity created by Martin, Waterstone notes that it is
now unclear as to whether a defendant must show that a rule modification will fundamentally
alter a sport or whether the defendant is required to present any proof if the rule is fundamental to
the sport or activity which is sought to be modified. Id.
459. National Basketball Association, Official Rules of the National Basketball Association,
Rule No.1]-Court Dimensions-Equipment, at http://www.nba.comanalysis/rules-index.htm
(last visited Mar. 11, 2002). Rule one, Section II(e) states that "[elach basket ring shall be
securely attached to the backboard with its upper edge 10' above and parallel to the floor and
equidistant from the vertical edges of the board." Id.

